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Abstract
On October 10, 2014, the Oklahoma State Penitentiary opened its doors
to the media to reveal a new state-of-the-art death chamber and announced
that it had created an efficient execution facility. To complement the
improvements to the prison architecture and the punishment technology, the
Oklahoma legislature amended the state’s execution protocol to formulate
effective procedures delineating what it considered appropriate
pharmacology to render a constitutional execution. This advance in design
and regulation, however, has not prevented subsequent maladministration
by various members of the Department of Corrections’ execution teams. On
January 16, 2015, Charles Warner was executed with the prison receiving
and using the wrong drugs. On October 16, 2015, due to further
operational mistakes, the District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma declared Richard Glossip’s case to be administratively closed.
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To investigate these systematic failings, a Multicounty Grand Jury was
convened and it considered evidence from stakeholders in the execution
process. Its Interim Report provided damning findings, which demonstrate
that the death penalty is still struggling for institutional legitimacy. The
continuation of botched executions, inappropriate alterations to the
protocol, and the claims of punishment experimentation on non-consenting
human subjects is contributing to a growing lack of confidence that
Oklahoma can maintain a humane form of capital punishment through
lethal injection.
These unacceptable circumstances occurred primarily as a result of the
uncomfortable relationship between the purported “science” of lethal
injection and the “constitutional law” of lethal injection, and therefore a
clear interpretation of the intellectual interplay of these two disciplines is
required. Both the procedural review parameters provided by the principles
of comity and finality, and the scientific methodologies of atomism and
holism for determining the epistemology of the pharmacology, will prove
illuminating. There are compelling questions concerning whether the
adjudicative process can produce sound reasoning for assessing the death
penalty. We are left with the situation in which there are still, and perhaps
always will be, ardent circumstances challenging the constitutionality of
Oklahoma’s lethal injection.
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“We only prepare what we regard as the normal dose, Socrates.”
“[I]t is a long time since we had a visitor . . . who could give us
any definite information, except that he was executed by
drinking hemlock; nobody could tell us anything more than
that.”
— Phaedo, Plato, The Last Days of Socrates **
I. Introduction
1

There is great pressure placed upon the capital judicial process.2 Each
participant in the death penalty feels the extreme burden of their task, be it
** PLATO, THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATES: EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO AND PHAEDO
198, 116 (Hugh Tredennick & Harold Tarrant trans., 2003).
1. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
Robert Cover cogently discusses the agonism inherent within the adjudicative method,
saying that “[l]egal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death,” that “[l]egal
interpretative acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon others,” and, on the
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the judge, the attorneys, the victims’ families, the Office of the Governor,
the Department of Corrections staff, police officers, witnesses, journalists,
or the wider interested communities (for example, retentionist3 and
abolitionist 4 organizations). It is perhaps evident that this pressure is most
acute in the build-up to, and in the administration of, an execution. There is
systematic scrutiny being applied to the actions of the execution teams 5
(with an emphasis on the Restraint Team, IV Team, and Special Operations
Team 6), the efficacy of the execution equipment, and the changing array of
death penalty, that “[t]he questions of whether the death sentence is constitutionally
permissible and, if it is, whether to impose it, are among the most difficult problems a judge
encounters” because “in capital punishment the action or deed is extreme and irrevocable,
there is pressure placed upon the word.” Id. at 1601, 1622 (footnote omitted).
2. In the Elkouri Inaugural Lecture on October 9, 2005, Professor Randall Coyne
effectively demonstrated that the pressure that is placed upon Oklahoma’s capital judicial
system rendered unjust capital sentences for Adolph Munson, Ronald Williamson, and
Robert Miller. Randall Coyne, Dead Wrong in Oklahoma, 42 TULSA L. REV. 209, 240
(2006). To emphasize the injustice, Coyne quoted the dissent of Justice Blackmun in Callins
v. Collins: “[T]he basic question—does the system accurately and consistently determine
which defendants ‘deserve’ to die?—can not be answered in the affirmative.” Id. (quoting
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994)) (Blackman, J., dissenting).
3. E.g., JUSTICE FOR ALL, http://www.jfa.net/ (last updated Oct. 28, 2011); PRO-DEATH
PENALTY.COM http://www.prodeathpenalty.com/ (last updated Oct. 12, 2014).
4. E.g., AMICUS, http://www.amicus-alj.org/ (last visited May 12, 2017); Cornell Law
School: Death Penalty Project, CORNELL L. SCH., http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/
research/death-penalty-project/ (last visited May 12, 2017); Death Penalty, AMNESTY INT’L,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/death-penalty/ (last visited May 12, 2017); Death
Penalty, REPRIEVE, http://www.reprieve.org.uk/topic/death-penalty/ (last visited May 12,
2017); DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (last visited May 12,
2017); MURDER VICTIMS’ FAMILIES FOR RECONCILIATION, http://www.mvfr.org/ (last visited
May 12, 2017); OKLA. COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, http://okcadp.org/ (last
visited May 12, 2017).
5. See, e.g., Interim Report Number 14 of the Grand Jury, In re Multicounty Grand
Jury, State of Oklahoma, Case No. SCAD-2014-70, at 100 (Okla. May 19, 2016); Jon
Yorke, Glossip v Gross: Taking Up Justice Breyer’s Call to Question the Death Penalty,
OXFORD HUM. RTS. HUB: BLOG, (July 30, 2015), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/glossip-v-grosstaking-up-justice-breyers-call-to-question-the-death-penalty/; Richard Glossip: Oklahoma
Halts Execution ‘to Check Drugs,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-us-canada-34405979.
6. See Okla. Dep’t of Corrections, Execution of Offenders Sentenced to Death,
Operations Memorandum No. OP-040301 5-9 (June 30, 2015), http://www.ok.gov/doc/
documents/op040301.pdf. Section IV records the following teams in Oklahoma’s execution
procedures: (a) Command Team; (b) H Unit Section Teams-Restraint Team, Special
Operations Team; (c) Intravenous Team; (d) Maintenance Response Team; (e) Critical
Incident Management Team; (f) Traffic Control Team; (g) Witness Escort Teams; and (h)
Victim Services Team. Id.; see, e.g., Interim Report Number 14 of the Grand Jury, In re
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pharmacological substances used in lethal injection. This extensive
evaluation has revealed, in the words of Deborah Denno, that there is
currently a “lethal injection chaos”7 across the death penalty states, and
recent events have demonstrated that the State of Oklahoma plays an
unenviable role in the frantic practical and procedural vicissitudes that are
occurring.
The source of the chaos in Oklahoma is found in the interaction between
the different actors determining the purported “science” of lethal injection 8
and the “constitutional law” of lethal injection.9 This interaction creates a
“science-litigation interface” 10 within which law as an institution and
science as an institution are struggling for legitimacy. 11 The resultant
procedural friction occasions the question as to whether the judicial
proceedings have revealed the science of lethal injection to the best of our
knowledge. There needs to be a clear articulation that the scientific
findings, which the litigation has cast a lens upon, are not a mere assertion
and affirmation of state policy-relevant science, or an illegitimate reduction
of the science in an expression of reductio ad absurdum (Latin for,
“reduction to absurdity”). What the courts need to provide is a transparent
and accurate reflection of the pharmacological properties and biological
effects of the execution drugs. 12 Ultimately, Oklahoma’s capital judicial

Multicounty Grand Jury, State of Oklahoma, Case No. SCAD-2014-70, at 100 (Okla. May
19, 2016).
7. Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1335
(2014) (discussing the evolution of pharmacological issues and the state’s attempts to ensure
a constitutional death penalty) (“There have been more changes in lethal injection protocols
during the past five years than there have been in the last three decades.”).
8. Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, Speaking Science to Law, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L.
REV. 289, 327 (2013) (arguing that “[e]ven where a judge is an expert with regard to the
subject of scientific testimony, the judge may take the structure of the two-party adversarial
litigation process for granted, and forget that the presentation of scientific expertise by both
sides will likely give the jury or even the judge himself the impression that science is
agnostic on the matter”).
9. See Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling
Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About
Us, 63 OHIO STATE L.J. 63 (2002).
10. Sanne H. Knudsen, Adversarial Science, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1503, 1507 (2015).
11. Sheila Jasanoff, Just Evidence: The Limits of Science in the Legal Process, 34 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 328, 330, 339, (2006) (arguing that law and science form a “social
enterprise” for determining questions of method and data within the adjudicative process and
that “science can deliver insights into matters otherwise hidden from judicial inquiry”).
12. See generally Shelia S. Jasanoff, Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science,
17 SOC. STUD. SCI. 195 (1987).
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process needs to allow science to speak to law, 13 and then listen and act
reasonably. It is questionable whether this has hitherto occurred.
This article uses the Warner-Glossip 14 litigation (specifically from 20142016) as a case study to reveal the pressure and resultant human error 15
within Oklahoma’s capital judicial process. To provide an interpretative
lens for this assessment, a reading is offered of how the State has adopted
(a) pharmacological science for the execution protocol through the
procedures created by the “principle of comity” 16 in the establishment of
reciprocal federal-state governmental and adjudicative norms and (b) the
“doctrine of finality” 17 via the mechanisms for the closure of proceedings
and the ultimate implementation of the punishment. At issue is the extent to
which Oklahoma’s government legitimately utilizes comity and finality,
thus contributing to an effective and efficient capital judicial system or the
13. See generally Hussy Freeland, supra note 8 (providing useful insights into this
narrative and discourse of science in the courtroom).
14. Charles Frederick Warner was convicted of the 1997 brutal rape and murder of
eleven-month-old Adrianna Waller. Warner v. State, 2006 OK CR 40, ¶¶ 1-2, 144 P.3d 838,
856. Richard Eugene Glossip was sentenced to death for the commission of the 1997 murder
of Barry Van Treese. Glossip v. State, 2001 OK CR 21, ¶¶ 1-5, 29 P.3d 597, 598-99. There
are substantial grounds for arguing that Glossip is innocent of this crime. See Richard
Glossip Is Innocent, MINISTRY AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY, http://www.
sisterhelen.org/richard (last visited May 12, 2017) (Sister Helen Prejean's campaign);
RICHARD E. GLOSSIP, http://www.richardeglossip.com/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2017) (Richard
Glossip's website); see also Glossip v. State, 2007 OK CR 12, 157 P.3d 143 (discussing the
case’s history). The question of Glossip’s culpability is outside of the scope of this article,
but, considering the evidence in the case, this author is also convinced that beyond a
reasonable doubt Glossip is innocent.
15. The Committee on Quality of Health Care in America has published detailed
examples of human error in the American health care system and concludes that “[h]ealth
care is not as safe as it should be. A substantial body of evidence points to medical errors as
a leading cause of death and injury.” COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., TO ERR IS
HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 26 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000). In
studying human error, James Reason observed:
Not only must more effective methods of predicting and reducing dangerous
errors emerge from a better understanding of mental processes, it has also
become increasingly apparent that such theorising, if it is to provide an
adequate picture of cognitive control processes, must explain not only correct
performance, but also the more predictable varieties of human fallibility.
JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR 1 (1990).
16. See generally Gil Seinfeld, Reflections on Comity in the Law of American
Federalism, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1309 (2015).
17. See generally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (discussing the taxonomy of the doctrine
of finality to facilitate effective legal process).
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revealing under what circumstances these principles are asymmetrically
applied and thus engender politico-legal problems. 18 In assessing the death
penalty, the comity-finality relationship is not merely expressed as a
normative contingency, in that once comity has been completed the finality
of an execution can automatically ensue. It is not that simple. This
investigation aims to reveal that the two principles can interact to produce
complex outcomes that do not necessarily facilitate a facially constitutional
punishment, and this has been evident in Oklahoma, particularly in the
procedure and process of lethal injection.
Part II of this article outlines the application of the principles of comity
and finality within the architecture of American federalism. The general
discourses on comity and finality provide interpretive methodologies for
uncovering the current turbulence within Oklahoma’s lethal injection
protocol. These adjudicative mechanisms are then utilized to accommodate
scientific methodologies for the interpretation of the biological effects of
the pharmacological substances used in the executions. Part III analyzes the
role of the judge as “scientific gatekeeper.” 19 The judicial guidance for
assessing the presentation of expert testimony within the courtroom is set
out, and the importance of the judge’s understanding the technical
interpretive methodologies of atomism (viewing scientific issues in a
confined analysis) 20 and holism (placing a scientific issue on a horizon of
interpretation with other relevant variables) 21 is revealed. A frisson occurs
in the identification of the appropriate methodology for the assessment of
pharmacology to reveal whether Oklahoma’s statute functions in the way
that the State claims.
Following the discussion of these methodologies, the article then reviews
state preparations and implementation of the execution protocol. Part IV
deconstructs the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma’s
ruling in Warner v. Gross, 22 which considered Oklahoma’s use of
18. See, e.g., Andrew Chongseh Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal
Judgments Less Final Can Further the “Interests of Finality,” 2013 UTAH L. REV. 561; Lee
Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443 (2007);
JoAnn Lee, Note, An Empirical Analysis of Habeas Corpus: The Impact of Teague v. Lane
and the Anti-Terrorism and Death Penalty Act on Habeas Petition Success Rates and
Judicial Efficiency, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 665 (2006).
19. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
20. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Atomism, Holism, and the Judicial Assessment of Evidence, 60
UCLA L. REV. 1524, 1527 (2013).
21. Id.
22. Warner v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665-F, 2014 WL 7671680 (W.D. Okla. 2014), aff'd,
776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. 2015), aff'd sub nom. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
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midazolam 23 as an anesthetic in lethal injection. During the evidentiary
hearing, the parties presented conflicting expert testimony on the
fundamental question of whether midazolam can induce and maintain a
surgical plane of anesthesia during the execution. Of interpretive
importance is the necessity for the court not to confine reasonable and
significant bodies of scientific opinion but instead to provide a transparent
and even-handed adjudication. It is argued, however, that an unjustified
confining judgment was handed down through a selective use of the
science. Part V outlines the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s
affirmation of the district court judgment. 24 It appears apparent that
restrictive, adjudicative, techniques were repeated in the appeal to affirm
the State’s use of midazolam. It becomes disputable whether the Tenth
Circuit’s self-reflective assessment of the sufficiency of the scientific
scrutiny stands up to sound qualitative and quantitative methodology.
The majority and dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court in Glossip v.
Gross 25 regarding the science and logistics of Oklahoma’s execution
protocol are reviewed in Part VI. Fundamental questions of the burden of
proof, the extent to which comity has been observed, the promotion of
atomism over holism concerning expert scientific testimony, and the
shadow of finality over the process, reveal hidden truths concerning the
interpretative and adjudicative mechanisms for the reducing and packaging
of sound pharmacology to promote quixotic state policy outcomes. It
appears that the Supreme Court failed to adhere to sound scientific
principles and thus engendered a denial of the petitioner’s constitutional
rights. Part VII provides a commentary on the post-Glossip issues.
Following the imprudent confidence of the district court—and the affirming
judgments of the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court—for declaring the
effectiveness of Oklahoma’s new execution protocol, a damning further
example of human error occurred resulting in Glossip’s execution being
stayed and the proceedings being administratively closed.26 The resultant
Multicounty Grand Jury investigations into the opportunities for negligence
within Oklahoma’s execution protocol uncovers a significant array of
23. Midazolam was first synthesized in 1976 and it belongs to the class of drugs known
as benzodiazepines. J.G. Reves et al., Midazolam: Pharmacology and Uses, 62
ANESTHESIOLOGY 310, 310 (1985).
24. Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir.), aff'd sub nom. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.
Ct. 2726 (2015).
25. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
26. Joint Stipulation for Administrative Closing of Case, Glossip v. Gross, Case No.
CIV-14-665-F (W.D. Okla. Oct. 16, 2015).
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reprimand-worthy mistakes in both the execution of Charles Warner and in
the preparations for the execution of Richard Glossip. Part VIII concludes
by questioning whether there will always be irredeemable vicissitudes
within the execution protocol and considers whether it is now evidently
futile to keep tinkering with Oklahoma’s machinery of death. It seems clear
that it is now time to banish the punishment to the state’s annals of history.
II. Comity, Finality, and the Capital Judicial Process
A. Comity
Comity is a principle of international law for maintaining
intergovernmental relationships27 in a reciprocal procedural recognition of
national legislation, judicial decisions, and other interests represented
within bilateral and multilateral communications.28 This principle has been
used to facilitate a political and legal courtesy within the architecture of
American federalism, and it promotes cooperative jurisdictional
competencies. Whilst it is clear that a procedural hierarchy is created, the
balance of the powers and responsibilities between the state and the federal
government has become a sensitive, symbiotic, manifestation. Of relevance
to this study, this includes the power of, and the responsibility for,
administering punishment. At the apex is the Supremacy Clause of Article
27. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522,
543 n.27 (1987) (“Comity refers to the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal
approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of other sovereign
states.”); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (“The extent to which the law of one
nation . . . shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation, depends upon
what our greatest jurists have been content to call ‘the comity of nations.’”); United States ex
rel. Trantino v. Hatrack, 563 F.2d 86, 103 (3d Cir. 1977).
28. See generally Paolo G. Carozza, “My Friend Is a Stranger”: The Death Penalty and
the Global Ius Commune of Human Rights, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2003) (providing an
informative discussion on transnational adjudicative dialogue). Whilst it is true to state that
the United States promotes comity of nations as a general principle of international law, it is
significant for the theme of this article to note the theory of “American exceptionalism” in
the application of the death penalty is increasing pulling America’s penological practice
outside the margins of civilized punishment. See generally Carol S. Steiker, Capital
Punishment and American Exceptionalism, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 57 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF
AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2004); David Garland, Capital Punishment and American
Culture, 7 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 347 (2005); James Q. Whitman, Response to Garland, 7
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 389, 395 (2005); Franklin E. Zimring, Path Dependence, Culture and
State-Level Execution Policy: A Reply to David Garland, 7 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 377
(2005).
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IV of the U.S. Constitution, 29 which prohibits state law that conflicts with
federal law, and in the event of a conflict, state law must yield to federal
law. 30 The Supremacy Clause is initiated when the state attempts to
“transcend [its] powers,” 31 and up to this point the federal government
allows state jurisdictional competence to rectify any unconstitutional issues.
Concerning this competency evaluation, Randall Coyne and Lyn Entzeroth
assert that “[c]omity dictates that the state should have an opportunity to
correct errors within its judicial system” 32 before being subject to the
scrutiny of the federal government. 33 In Ex parte Royall, the Supreme Court

29. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
30. The Supremacy Clause, however, typically applies only where an “act of Congress
fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State.” Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S.
501, 533 (1912).
31. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (laying out the federal
framework which ensures “State Legislatures . . . do not transcend their powers,” and stating
that if a state law “interfere[s] with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in
pursuance of the constitution . . . . [i]n every such case, the act of Congress . . . is supreme;
and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must
yield to it”).
32. RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 816 (4th ed. 2012) (noting that the “exhaustion requirement reflects the policies of
comity and federalism between the state and federal governments”). Coyne and Entzeroth
cite Picard v. Connor, in which the Supreme Court stated that “it would be unseemly in our
dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction
without an opportunity for the state courts to correct a constitutional violation.” Id. (quoting
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). In criminal proceedings, if a prisoner contends
that following state comity review that the state is still in violation of federal law the process
for relief in the filing of a writ of habeas corpus helps to ensure that “no one is held in
custody in either state or federal prison whose conviction or sentence was obtained or
otherwise imposed in violation of the federal Constitution or federal law.” Lyn Entzeroth,
Federal Habeas Review of Death Sentences, Where We Are Now?: A Review of Wiggins v.
Smith and Miller-el v. Cockrell, 39 TULSA L. REV. 49, 51 (2003).
33. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1886); COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 32,
at 809 (stating that Ex parte Royall was “a judicially crafted limitation on the ability of
federal courts to hear certain claims raised by state prisoners”). An adjudicative issue is not
ripe for the federal courts to consider unless the state has had a full opportunity to rectify any
unconstitutional issues, and Laurence Tribe noted that this juridico-political relationship was
designed to “protect[] the integrity of state law from potentially erroneous or gratuitously
intrusive federal judicial scrutiny.” LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 329, at 573 (3d ed. 2000).
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provided for the federal-state relationship regarding habeas corpus
proceedings and formulated the exhaustion of state remedies requirement
before federal intervention. 34 This exhaustive principle has subsequently
been codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)-(d), which legislatively demarcates
jurisdictional competencies. 35 Comity review issues include, inter alia (a)
the abstention doctrine, which provides jurisdictional competence for the
primacy of state law before federal intervention; 36 (b) the doctrine of
adequate and independent state grounds, which allows for antecedent state
decisions that “adequately” support the state dismissal of federal claims,
and which are demonstrated to be “independent” of federal law; 37 (c) the
jurisprudence of preemption, which is recognized above in the Supremacy
Clause, in which the Supreme Court has affirmed state laws that conflict

34. 117 U.S. at 250-53.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)-(c) (2012). The section states:
(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it
appears that—
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the State; or
(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the applicant.
(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits,
notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in
the courts of the State.
(3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement
or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through
counsel, expressly waives the requirement.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has
the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the
question presented.
Id. (see infra. 561, as 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is known as the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act 1998).
36. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943); Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (for the principle of
abstention).
37. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (for the doctrine of adequate and
independent state grounds); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Murdock v.
City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874) (for the primacy of state law).
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with federal law are “without effect;”38 and (d) the circumstances raised
within habeas corpus appeals. 39
Criminal justice proceedings should maintain a careful balancing of the
powers and interests of the national government, state government, and the
individual, and this is also reflected within the capital judicial process. 40
Focusing upon the death penalty, the State and the petitioner use the
principle of comity to ensure that there is fairness in the proceedings,
equality of arms, and due process of law.41 The realization of the federalstate relationship, however, is assessed on a variable, contingent basis: in
some circumstances, the federal government provides the scope for the
states to determine issues individually, 42 and in other examples, the
evolution of the law becomes an assessment of the rates of change/lack of
change in state legislation across the Union. 43 In the application of this
contingency, the capital judicial system has adopted the “language of

38. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516-18 (1992); Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)
(for the jurisprudence of preemption).
39. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citations omitted) (stating that within the national review structure the Supreme Court
maintains the “federal balance through judicial exposition of doctrines such as abstention,
the rules for determining the primacy of state law, the doctrine of adequate and independent
state grounds, the whole jurisprudence of preemption, and many of the rules governing our
habeas jurisprudence” (internal citations omitted)); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722 (1991); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S 467 (1991) (for the rules governing habeas corpus).
40. David Gottlieb & Randall Coyne, Habeas Corpus Practice in State and Federal
Courts, 31 N.M. L. REV. 201, 201 (2001) (noting that the writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 has “retained a significant amount of vitality in death penalty cases”).
41. See generally Joseph Blocher, The Death Penalty and the Fifth Amendment, 111
NW. U. L. REV. 275 (2016); Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano Is a Scarecrow: The Right to
Counsel in State Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079 (2006).
42. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (an example of the assessment of
quality of counsel in state cases); Entzeroth, supra note 32.
43. For the assessment of the rate of the change of state legislation for the categorical
exemption to the death penalty, see, for example, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312-13
(2002). For the rate of change—in states adopting legislation to abolish the death penalty for
people suffering from mental retardation—and Justice Steven’s observation on the passage
of bills in selected states, see id. at 314-15. For the rate of change—in state law on juvenile
capital offences—and Justice Kennedy’s observations on the changes, see Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005). For a discussion on how the rate of change in state
legislation can contribute to the national abolition of the death penalty see Brian Daniel
Anderson, Comment, Roper v. Simmons: How the Supreme Court of the United States Has
Established the Framework for Judicial Abolition of the Death Penalty in the United States,
37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 221, 229-33 (2011).
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experimentation” 44 and the courts have discerned the states as being
“laboratories” to determine constitutional questions. 45 The usefulness of the
analogy of the “laboratory” was identified by Justice Stevens in his
memorandum respecting the denial of certiorari in Lackey v. Texas. 46 In
considering the constitutionality of a prolonged stay on death row, which in
1995 was a “novel issue,” he held that new adjudicative circumstances will
permit the states to “serve as laboratories in which the [length of stay on
death row] receives further study before it is addressed by [the Supreme
Court].” 47 Justice Thomas, however, argued that Justice Stevens’s invitation
for the states to serve as “laboratories” was already completed.48 Justice
Breyer then rebutted this claim, stating that “although the experiment may
have begun, it is hardly evident that we ‘should consider the experiment

44. Justice Kennedy stated in United States v. Lopez, “the theory and utility of our
federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their role as laboratories for
experimentation to devise various solutions when the best solution is far from clear.” 514
U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING
ORIGINALISM 170 (2011) (discussing experimentation in the federalism framework) (“We
should take the language of experimentation seriously rather than as a rhetorical excuse for
nonregulation or as a way to resist the application of federal constitutional rights.
Experiments should be encouraged if they work to the benefit of the entire nation. But if
these are genuine experiments, experiments generally end at some point and the results are
tabulated; somebody has to decide whether the experiment is a success or a failure, and, if a
success, adopt best practices nationwide.”); Harrison Blythe, Comment, “Laboratories of
Democracy” or “Machinery of Death”? The Story of Lethal Injection Secrecy and a Call to
the Supreme Court for Intervention, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1269 (2015); Abbe R. Gluck,
The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the
New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010); Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing
Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 209 (2015).
45. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 326 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (observing that the death
penalty is primarily determined “through the workings of normal democratic processes in the
laboratories of the States”).
46. 514 U.S. 1045 (1995).
47. Id. at 1047 (citing McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983)). “Petitioner's
claim, with its legal complexity and its potential for far-reaching consequences, seems an
ideal example of one which would benefit from such further study.” Id.
48. In Knight v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. 459, 461 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (Justice
Thomas argued that Justice Stevens’s invitation to state and lower courts to serve as
“laboratories” in which the viability of this claim could receive further study has occurred,
and to prove his argument, he cited a large corpus of cases: White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432
(5th Cir. 1996); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir. 1995); Ex parte Bush, 695 So.2d
138 (Ala. 1997); State v. Schackart, 947 P.2d 315 (Ariz. 1997); People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183
(Cal. 1998); People v. Massie, 967 P.2d 29 (Cal. 1998); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272
(Mont. 199*6); Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
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concluded.’” 49 The disagreement on this aspect of the review of the death
penalty means that the comity issues are ongoing. 50 Viewing this interaction
between the Supreme Court Justices, the various aspects of the state
experiment with the death penalty can be interpreted as being a soluble
comity process of state policy and practice, state adjudication, and federal
assessment of the outcome(s).
Comity interests advanced by the states include (a) the procedure of the
capital judicial process to determine guilt or innocence, and if the defendant
is found guilty, the appropriateness of the sentence; and then (b) the various
components of the implementation of the punishment—from the
physiological and psychological impact of incarceration on death row
through to the preparations, adopted process, and method selected for an
execution. On the procedural issues, the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by
the Supreme Court focuses particularly on the Fifth Amendment, which
provides for the possibility of the capital judicial process; 51 the Sixth
Amendment, which guarantees assistance of counsel in death penalty
cases; 52 the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits punishment that
constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment;” 53 and the Fourteenth
Amendment, which provides for “equal protection of the laws.” 54 However,
the judicial assessment is not confined to the federal review of a state’s
observance of these amendments, as the adjudication also encompasses
state and federal consideration of international law.
The American federal architecture adopts mechanisms for discerning the
extent to which the state provides to foreign nationals, who are brought
within the capital judicial process, the right of access to their consular under
49. Knight, 120 S. Ct. at 465 (Breyer., J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
50. See Valle v. Florida, 564 U.S. 1067 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger . . . .”).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
Witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.”).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
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Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (hereinafter
“VCCR”). 55 Following the International Court of Justice’s decision in
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals v. the United States, 56 President
George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the Optional Protocol of
the VCCR. 57 This was an attempt to prevent international review of
domestic cases involving foreign nationals. The action prima facie nullified
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to hear cases brought by
the Member States of foreign nationals incarcerated on death row in the
United States. 58 Consistent with this executive action, the Supreme Court

55. Section one of Article 36 reads:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to
nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the
sending State and to have access to them. . . .;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall,
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its
consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to
prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.
Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person
arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the
said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the
person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending
State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond
with him and to arrange for his legal representation. . . .
U.N. Conference on Consular Relations, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36,
§ 1, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (Apr. 24, 1963).
56. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
57. See John Quigley, The United States’ Withdrawal from International Court of
Justice Jurisdiction in Consular Cases: Reasons and Consequences, 19 DUKE. J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 263, 264-71 (2009).
58. Whilst in a normative application of the status of international conventions via
Member State ratification, reservations, and revocation, it could be argued that the United
States has severed the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. However, under the
Charter of the United Nations, it appears that the U.S. is still bound to adhere to the
judgments of the I.C.J. as Article 94 states:
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the
decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it
under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to
the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make
recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the
judgment.
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has denied it possesses jurisdictional competence to affirm the application
of the VCCR as an expression of federal law across the Union. 59 Even so,
some state courts have assessed the justifiable reach of Article 36. For
example, in Torres v. Oklahoma,60 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals held that it was appropriate to allow for an evidentiary hearing to
consider whether the petitioner’s VCCR rights applied to the capital judicial
process in the state. 61 In Gutierrez v. Nevada, the Nevada Supreme Court
held that Article 36 applied to provide an adequate interpreter during court
proceedings. 62 As such, the states adhere to Congress’ treaty signing
powers (and thus, authority) under Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution, 63 but in an application of state comity, there are examples that
the states themselves will consider the standards of international law.
Having reviewed selected wider factors of jurisdictional competence, this
focus on the comity investigation now presents the narrowed considerations
of state capital adjudicative processes and the use of punishment
technologies. The Supreme Court held that the death penalty is to be
reserved for the “worst of the worst” 64 criminal and that capital defendants
and death row inmates need to be clearly classified via the Court’s
“narrowing jurisprudence, which seeks to ensure that only the most

See also Michael J. Glennon & Robert D. Sloane, The Sad, Quiet Death of Missouri v.
Holland: How Bond Hobbled the Treaty Power, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 98 (2016)
(discussing this application of international law).
59. See Medellin v. Texas, 554 U.S. 759, 759-60 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,
548 U.S. 331 (2006); Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S.
371 (1998).
60. Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442, 2004 WL 3711623, at 1 (Okla. Crim. App. May
13, 2004) (order granting stay of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing).
61. See generally Heather L. Finstuen, Note, From the World Court to Oklahoma
Court: The Significance of Torres v. State for International Court of Justice Authority,
Individual Rights, and the Availability of Remedy in Vienna Convention Disputes, 58 OKLA.
L. REV. 255 (2005).
62. Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506, 2012 WL 4355518 (Nev. Sept. 19, 2012); see also
Sandra Babcock, The Limits of International Law: Efforts to Enforce Rulings of the
International Court of Justice in U.S. Death Penalty Cases, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 183
(2012) (discussing the VCCR Article 36 case law).
63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . .”).
64. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is the
point to which the particulars of crime and criminal are relevant: within the category of
capital crimes, the death penalty must be reserved for ‘the worst of the worst.’”).
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deserving of execution are put to death . . . .”65 Once this narrow class of
the worst criminal is identified, adjudicative assessment of the two main
principles of punishment utilized by the state to legitimize the death penalty
are initiated. Since the reintroduction of the death penalty in Gregg v.
Georgia 66 in 1976, the penological interests for justifying the death penalty
are most commonly found within the theories of retribution67 and
deterrence. 68 In the propositions for proportional retribution (which is
classically formulated from the lex talionic 69 “eye-for-an-eye” 70 principle),
it is claimed by retentionists that there exists a legitimate punishment
interest to put to death the “worst of the worst” class of persons who
commit homicide.71 In the application of deterrence, it is argued that there
65. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319; see also Chelsea C. Sharon, The “Most Deserving” of
Death: The Narrowing Requirement and the Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital
Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 223 (2011).
66. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
67. See Andrew Oldenquist, Retribution and the Death Penalty, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV.
335 (2004). But see LLOYD STEFFEN, EXECUTING JUSTICE: THE MORAL MEANING OF THE
DEATH PENALTY (1998) (rebutting the retribution argument for the application of the death
penalty).
68. See Michael L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The
Views of the Experts, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1996); Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital
Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58
STAN. L. REV. 751 (2005).
69. Immanuel Kant famously declared in his formulation of talionic justice, “[I]f he has
committed murder, he must die. In this case, no possible substitute can satisfy justice. . . .
This equality of punishments is therefore possible only if the judge passes the death sentence
in accordance with the strict law of retribution.” Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of
Morals, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 131, 156 (Hans Reiss ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed.
1991).
70. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (3d ed. 2002); Erwin J. Urch, The Law Code of Hammurabi, 15
A.B.A. J. 437, 438 (1929).
71. It is highly debatable whether the capital judicial process can consistently and fairly
identify the “worst of the worst” criminal. The Supreme Court decision in Kansas v. Marsh,
548 U.S. 163 (2006), considered the practical vicissitudes in the Kansas jury being presented
with aggravating and mitigating circumstances which were evenly balanced. Id. at 165-66.
The criminal could not be classified as the worst of the worst, but the court was allowed to
impose a death sentence. Id. at 181. See generally Benjamin Barron, Equipoise, Collective
Rights and the Future of the Death Penalty: Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006), 30
HARV. J.L. & POL’Y 439 (2006) (reviewing Kansas v. Marsh); Elizabeth Brandenburg, Note,
Kansas v. Marsh: A Thumb on the Scale of Death?, 58 MERCER L. REV 1447 (2007) (same).
Due to the inherent persistence of arbitrary sentencing there is a practical impossibility of the
capital judicial system maintaining a fair and consistent assessment of the “worst of the
worst,” and this fanciful idea has been rejected by various sociologists, criminologists and
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is a preventative phenomenon within the capital sanction and it can be
proven to contribute to the reduction of serious crime. 72 Retentionist states
argue that if these two interests are reflected within the full comity review,
the capital sanction through to an execution is a legitimate punishment.
The comity interests promoted by the defendants and post-conviction
prisoners include ensuring an adequate process for the choice of whether to
allow the execution through the prisoner’s autonomous and informed
decision renouncing all future appeals (known as “volunteering for
execution” 73), or for the prisoner to pursue any direct review, collateral
attack or further habeas corpus appeals available to him or her. Most people
sentenced to death are interested in using the appeals process to ensure that
life remains. The right to continue life claims will include, inter alia, that
the sentence was wrong as petitioner maintains his or her innocence, 74 that
the narrowing jurisprudence of the “worst of the worst” was misapplied, 75
that petitioner has mental health issues which should have reduced the
moral culpability for the crime, 76 and that the quality of the defense team
was below the standard of effective representation.77 It is here that the
comity principle to adequately review such claims has a direct relationship
with protecting the right to life of the petitioner, as mechanisms are utilized
to maintain life in the presence of an impending execution. However, even

human rights lawyers. For example, Jonathan Simon and Christina Spaulding have argued
that the extent to which defendants are identified as “death eligible” from pre- to postFurman, is almost indistinguishable. Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our
Esteem: Aggravating Factors in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING
STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE, 86, 87 (Austin Sarat ed.,
1999).
72. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
73. See John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and Competency,
103 MICH. L. REV. 939 (2005); Anthony J. Casey, Maintaining the Integrity of Death: An
Argument for Restricting a Defendant’s Right to Volunteer for Execution at Certain Stages
in Capital Proceedings, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 75 (2002); Meredith M. Rountree, Volunteers for
Execution: Directions for Further Research into Grief, Culpability and Legal Structures, 82
UMKC L. REV. 295 (2014).
74. See Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573 (2004); Michael L. Radelet, The Role of the Innocence Argument in
Contemporary Death Penalty Debates, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 199 (2008).
75. See supra note 71.
76. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1991-92 (2014); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 320-21 (2002); Ashley Sachiko Wong, Note, Aligning the Criminal Justice System with
the Mental Health Profession in Response to Hall v. Florida, 94 OR. L. REV. 425 (2016).
77. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 678 (1984).
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if the prisoner wants to stay alive, but it is deemed that there is now
approaching a moment of closure in the litigation and the execution can
proceed, both the state and the prisoner still have comity interests in
ensuring that the punishment method meets constitutional standards and
does not impose “needless suffering.” 78 Indeed, this is the central focus of
Parts III-VII below.
It is evident by this short review that comity in the death penalty is a
complex principle within the federal architecture. In reaction to the
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City on April 19,
1995, there was great political pressure on President Bill Clinton for these
complex issues to be processed in an expedient manner and thus the
greasing of the death penalty wheels was created through the adoption of
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) in 1998. 79
The AEDPA limits both the procedural issues (for example, preventing
successive petitions 80) and substantive issues (for example, the assessment
of the performance of counsel 81 or the diagnosis of the mental health of the
petitioner 82), and so the legislation is designed to reduce the scope of the
writ of habeas corpus. Consequently, this legislative provision is intended
to streamline the review; however, a potential arises for the interests of
comity to come into conflict with the doctrine of finality.
B. Finality
The AEDPA was designed to ensure that once comity is observed and
completed by the state and federal courts, a different feature of the capital
judicial process is then initiated—that of finality. In 1963, Paul Bator
articulated a landmark taxonomy on the doctrine of finality, 83 and his work
now finds a privileged status within “legal process theory” scholarship. 84
78. The prohibition of punishment which is “‘sure or very likely to cause serious illness
or needless suffering,’ and give rise to ‘sufficiently imminent dangers,’” was affirmed in
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 34-35
(1993)).
79. See Kovarsky, supra note 18 (critiquing the AEDPA); Lee, supra note 18 (same).
80. See Deborah L. Stahlkopf, A Dark Day for Habeas Corpus: Successive Petitions
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1115
(1998).
81. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1983); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534.
82. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1986; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304.
83. Bator, supra note 17, at 452-53. See generally Kim, supra note 18 (cogently
critiquing the doctrine of finality).
84. William Eskridge explains that legal process theory is “set forth in a purpose-based
version of legal positivism.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., Nino’s Nightmare: Legal Process
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Bator’s theory is based on the notion that the principle of comity cannot
allow criminal proceedings to be unending as “[t]here comes a point where
a procedural system which leaves matters perpetually open no longer
reflects humane concern but merely anxiety and a desire for immobility.” 85
The creation of a legitimate criminal (and thus, capital) justice process is
thus contingent upon a moment in time at which the state can say—the case
is now closed. It is final in an expression of procedural termination. 86 This
is primarily an application of case management over the protection of
constitutional rights because it is proposed that “[f]ew things have so
plagued the administration of criminal justice, or contributed more to lower
public confidence in the courts, than the interminable appeals, the retrials,
and the lack of finality.” 87 Even so, Bator still informed us that there is a
“problem of finality” that needs to be resolved, “as it bears on the great task
of creating rational institutional schemes for the administration of the
criminal law.” 88 Such rationality should also apply to the capital judicial
system.
Theory as a Jurisprudence of Toggling Between Facts and Norms, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 865,
865 (2013). Brad Snyder identifies that the components of legal process theory involve
“‘reasoned elaboration’ from judges, ‘neutral principles’ from judicial decisions, use of
‘passive virtues’ by the Supreme Court, and the understanding of institutional
interrelationships among courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies.” Brad Snyder,
Rejecting the Legal Process Theory Joker: Bill Nelson’s Scholarship on Judge Edward
Weinfeld and Justice Byron White, 89 CHI-KENT. L. REV. 1065, 1066 (2014) (footnotes
omitted); see also Steven Graines & Justin Wyatt, The Rehnquist Court, Legal Process
Theory, and McClesky v. Kemp, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2000); Theodore W. Jones, Textualism
and Legal Process Theory: Alternative Approaches to Statutory Interpretation, 26 J. LEGIS.
45 (2000).
85. Bator, supra note 17, at 452-53.
86. The Supreme Court has noted, “While we have long recognized that States have an
interest in securing the finality of their judgments, finality is not a stand-alone value that
trumps a State's overriding interest in ensuring that justice is done in its courts and secured
to its citizens.” Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 98
(2009) (internal citations omitted).
87. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405-06 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
88. Bator, supra note 17, at 446. As detailed below in this article, there are many
examples within the capital judicial system to challenge Bator’s assumptions on the
effectiveness and utility of finality. In the remarks given at the memorial service for Paul
Bator at the University of Chicago Law School on March 4, 1989, Charles Fried commented
on Bator’s Harvard Law Review article of 1963, stating:
We can almost feel Paul working to tie some very technical and intricate
matter to the most basic stuff of our institutions as thoughtful, decent citizens.
And there is the underlying faith that there are thoughtful, decent persons—
judges, students, lawyers—that they can understand and will respond.
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The Supreme Court in Herrera v. Collins identified the “need for finality
in capital cases,” 89 and it is most clearly expressed through the execution of
the inmate. However, “finality” in the death penalty is a difficult
phenomenon to legitimately achieve. There is a beginning of finality, which
occurs at the pronouncement of the death sentence when the trial judge sets
the original date for the execution. 90 The end of finality only occurs
following an execution, or in the decision for a granting of a stay, or the
finding of an exonerating circumstance and a parole board or governor
granting clemency. 91 What occurs in between the beginning and the end is
the engagement, and potential friction or agonism, with comity interests.
An interaction between comity and finality occurs, which can ferment the
pressure of the need for the beginning to become the end. 92 State interests in
finality solidify when the appeals have been exhausted and the
constitutionality of the method of the execution has been affirmed. After
which, legitimate finality can be fulfilled in an execution. On the other
hand, whilst an execution is a state finality-outcome interest, if the inmate
files appeals, then he or she strives for an opposite finality-outcome in a
decision that allows his or her life to continue. Therefore, the case becomes
closed by the revocation of the death sentence, not its implementation. A
finality outcome can thus be expressed in different ways by the different
parties. 93
It may be because for a while that faith was shaken that he fell relatively
silent.
Charles Fried, Paul Bator, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 419, 420 (1989).
89. 506 U.S. 390, 418 (1993).
90. Or perhaps in some accused minds it occurs at the capital charge, as the realization
of the possibility of being brought within the capital judicial system can initiate the adverse
psychological effects of the death row phenomenon. See Jon Yorke, Inhuman Punishment
and the Abolition of the Death Penalty in the Council of Europe, 16 EUR. PUB. L. 77 (2010).
91. Examples of the work of those exonerated fighting the death penalty can be found
online at Witness to Innocence, the Equal Justice Initiative, and within the data on innocence
collected by the Death Penalty Information Center. See WITNESS TO INNOCENCE,
http://www.witnesstoinnocence.org/ (last visited May 12, 2017); THE EQUAL JUSTICE
INITIATIVE, http://eji.org/death-penalty/innocence (last visited May 12, 2017); DEATH
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-deathpenalty (last visited May 12, 2017).
92. Lee Kovarsky has noted this tension as comity and finality are not necessarily
“mutually reinforcing interests,” and in the “relationship between AEDPA’s exhaustion
provision and its statute of limitations,” the friction is apparent. Kovarsky, supra note 18, at
457.
93. See generally AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL: WHAT IT MEANS TO STOP AN
EXECUTION (2007).
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Generally, finality interests in death penalty cases are prima facie more
difficult to achieve than in non-capital criminal proceedings. A key finality
interest in non-capital criminal proceedings is that it preserves the resources
of the criminal justice system to enable it to effectively determine future
cases. They are not confined to fiscal calculations but extend to the
“intellectual, moral and political resources involved in the legal system.” 94
It is further claimed that the closure of the proceedings incentivizes defense
counsel to provide effective assistance for the defendant(s) as preserved
within the Sixth Amendment’s “assistance of counsel” clause.95 Also, it is
maintained that the absoluteness of a decision contributes to the general and
specific deterrent effect as a principle of penology—for example, found in
the slogan, “life should mean life.” 96 Otherwise, society will question and
potentially lose confidence in the effectiveness of the sentencing system. 97
These normative interests in finality, however, are not systematically
reflected in the death penalty. In fact, the capital judicial process struggles
to implement these interests, and in many instances, it blatantly fails. This
is because of the significant expense in funding the resources for sufficient
defense teams for both the guilt/innocence phase and the mitigation phase
of the trial, and then the proceeding post-conviction appeals through to
clemency hearings. 98 The American Bar Association’s Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases 99 provides a detailed framework for establishing capital
representation from a multi-generational analysis of the client’s life history,
through to effective trial (and appeals) representation, and the composition

94. Bator, supra note 17, at 451.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, (holding that ineffective
assistance of counsel claims had to show two elements: (i) the counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness; and, (ii) counsel’s performance prejudiced
the defense so as to deny a fair trial).
96. See Jonathan Simon, How Should We Punish Murder?, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1241
(2011) (discussing the appropriate punishment for murder).
97. See Sarah L. Cooper, Judicial Responses to Challenges to Firearms-Identification
Evidence: A Need for New Judicial Perspectives on Finality, 31 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 457
(2014) (critiquing finality interests); Kim, supra note 18 (same).
98. See Costs of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs-death-penalty (last visited May 12, 2017) (assessing the growing
costs of the death penalty within individual states).
99. Am. Bar Ass’n, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003); see also Am. Bar Ass’n,
Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty
Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (2008).
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and role of the mitigation team. 100 When considering the interests of
finality, it is clear that the death penalty consistently fails to meet these
performance thresholds, as the capricious body of cases detailing
substandard legal representation demonstrates that ineffective assistance of
counsel is commonplace. 101 There is no reliable evidence that the capital
sanction and executions provide a general (or specific) deterrent effect,102
and executions are commonly botched, which violates the principle that
finality in punishment must reflect only constitutional standards. 103 The
result is that the capital judicial process poses the greatest opportunity for
finality to compromise justice and confidence in a procedurally fair
outcome. 104
Finality interests are further complicated by the wider consultation on the
death penalty. The abolitionist community has lobbied politicians, initiated
litigation, and sought to ensure that the commercial world is reflective of
constitutional standards and human rights values. A very successful
campaign resulted in international focus on pharmaceutical companies’
contracts to manufacture and distribute substances for state prisons to use in
executions. 105 For a combination of reasons, including human rights
arguments, 106 the medical ethics of primum non nocere (Latin for, “first do
100. For further details on the standards of representation see the American Bar
Association’s Death Penalty Representation Project, which provides capital representation
resources from both the federal and state jurisdictions. See Death Penalty Representation
Project, AM. B. ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_rep
resentation.html (last visited May 12, 2017).
101. See, e.g., Wiggins, 539 U.S. at. 510; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668.
102. ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE
PERSPECTIVE 389-423 (5th ed. 2015).
103. See infra Part VII.
104. See Kovarsky, supra note 18, at 454.
105. The European Union was the first political region to adopt legislation banning the
production and trade in execution technologies beginning in 2005 and it was strengthened in
2010. See European Parliament Resolution on Implementation of Council Regulation,
Concerning Trade in Certain Goods Which Could be Used for Capital Punishment, Torture
or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (EC) No. 1236/2005 of 17
June 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 236); see AMNESTY INT’L, FROM WORDS TO DEEDS: MAKING THE
EU BAN ON THE TRADE IN ‘TOOLS OF TORTURE’ A REALITY (2010), https://www.amnesty.org/
en/documents/eur01/004/2010/en/ (exampling the human rights arguments on the violations
occurring from trade in execution technologies); Christian Behrmann & Jon Yorke, The
European Union and Abolition of the Death Penalty, 4 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE
COMPANION 1 (2013), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilronline/39/ (reviewing the
European Union’s policies on the abolition of the death penalty).
106. See generally SANGMIN BAE, WHEN THE STATE NO LONGER KILLS: INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS AND ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2007); HOOD & HOYLE,
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no harm” 107), and the growing sense of “corporate social responsibility,” 108
American pharmaceutical companies have revoked their licenses with the
Food and Drug Administration (hereinafter “FDA”) to manufacture sodium
thiopental for end-use as an anesthetic in the execution protocol.
Consequently, retentionist states’ stocks of anesthetics for executions began
to deplete, and run out, 109 and so to continue to administer the death penalty
they have selected other drugs, such as pentobarbital 110 and midazolam. 111
This has become necessary because of the Supreme Court’s awkward
reasoning in Baze v. Rees that as the death penalty is constitutional “there
must be a constitutional means to administer it.”112 So the states now look
to pharmacological science to give life to the capital judicial system.
Oklahoma positions itself at the forefront of this incongruous endeavor.

supra note 102; SCHABAS, supra note 70; AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: INTERNATIONAL
INITIATIVES AND IMPLICATIONS (Jon Yorke ed., 2008) [hereinafter AGAINST THE DEATH
PENALTY].
107. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BREACH OF TRUST: PHYSICIAN
PARTICIPATION IN EXECUTIONS IN THE U.S. (1994); William J. Curran & Ward Casscells, The
Ethics of Medical Participation in Capital Punishment by Intravenous Drug Injection, 302
NEW ENG. J. MED. 226 (1980); Neil Farber et al., Physicians’ Attitudes About Involvement in
Lethal Injection for Capital Punishment, 160 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2912 (2000); Lisa
R. Hasday, The Hippocratic Oath as Literary Text: A Dialogue between Law and Medicine,
2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 299 (2002) (reviewing the legal implications of the
Hippocratic Oath); Paul Litton, Physician Participation in Executions, the Morality of
Capital Punishment, and the Practical Implications of Their Relationship, 41 J.L. MED.
ETHICS 333 (2013).
108. See Evi Girling, Looking Death in the Face: The Benetton Death Penalty
Campaign, 6 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 271 (2004); Clare Algar, Big Pharma May Help End the
Death Penalty, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 22, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/115284/bigpharma-may-end-death-penalty; Business and Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.
amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/business-and-human-rights (last visited May 12, 2017)
(generally outlining the commercial sector and human rights).
109. By 2009, state prisons had run out of sodium thiopental for use as an anesthetic in
executions. See Brief for the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics at Fordham University
School of Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 22, Glossip v. Gross 135 S. Ct.
2726 (2015) (No. 14-7955), 2015 WL 1247189.
110. The pharmacological substance pentobarbital and its use in Kentucky’s execution
protocol was considered in the litigation in Baze, 553 U.S. at 56-57.
111. See Brief of Sixteen Professors of Pharmacology as Amici Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at 9, Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (No. 14-7955), 2015 WL
1247193.
112. Baze, 553 U.S. at 47.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss4/1

2017]

OKLAHOMA’S LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOL

569

III. Determining Scientific Evidence in the Courtroom
The adjudication on the science for executions has become a key issue
for balancing comity and finality interests. A central issue for determination
is the management of pain in punishment under the Eighth Amendment, 113
and it is of crucial importance that a transparent assessment of the
pharmacology used in executions is available to discern the highest
“epistemological quality of scientific research results.”114 In 1977,
Oklahoma began its experiment with lethal injection as a method of
execution and it adopted policies to attempt to ensure that appropriate drugs
were used in executions. 115 The inventor of lethal injection, Dr. Jay
Chapman, cautiously advised members of Oklahoma’s legislature that he
was “an expert in dead bodies but not an expert in getting them that
way.” 116 At the dawn of the state’s use of lethal injection, the journalist, Jim
Killackey, noted the early observations on the need to constantly assess the
pharmacology, as “[o]fficials feel that if and when they have to use the
injection law, new and better ways may be available.”117
113. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
114. Hussey Freeland, supra note 8. Carl Wenning stated that epistemology is the
philosophical enquiry into “ways of knowing and how we know,” and “[s]cience is a way of
knowing that requires a strong philosophical underpinning.” See Carl J. Wenning, Scientific
Epistemology: How Scientists Know What They Know, ILL. STATE UNIV. J. OF PHYSICS
TEACHER EDUC. ONLINE, Autumn 2009, at 3.
115. The possibility of lethal injection as a means of execution was considered by the
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in 1949-53. ROYAL COMM. ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953 REPORT, 1953, Cmd. 8932, at 257-61 (UK). In 1977, Dr. Jay
Chapman identified what he thought were appropriate pharmacological substances for use in
lethal injection as a new method of judicial execution in Oklahoma. See Denno, supra note
7, at 1340. Dr. Chapman has now recognized the problems inherent within the U.S. capital
judicial system, and in an interview, he claimed, “I had no idea, I was so naïve” about the
(in)effectiveness of the use of pharmacology in executions. Ed Pilkington, It’s Problematic:
Inventor of US Lethal Injection Reveals Death Penalty Doubts, GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/29/supreme-court-lethal-injection-inventordeath-penalty-doubts. In 1982, Texas was the first state to conduct a lethal injection and the
prisoner executed was Charles Brooks. This marked the beginning of the implementation of
this pharmacological process in the U.S. capital judicial system. Steve Carrell, Execution
Controversy Faces Physician, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 21, 1983, at 37, cited in Deborah W.
Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty,
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 79 (2007). For an excellent history of lethal injection, see generally
Denno, supra note 9.
116. Email from A. Jay Chapman, Forensic Pathologist, Santa Rosa, Cal., to Professor
Deborah Denno (Jan. 18, 2006) (on file with Denno), cited in Denno, supra note 7, at 1340.
117. Jim Killackey, Officials Draw a Grim Execution Scene, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov.
12, 1979, at 1, cited in Denno, supra note 7, at 1340; see Brief for The Louis Stein Center
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The original three drugs used in Oklahoma’s lethal injection executions
were sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride. 118
Over the past forty years there have been significant advances in
pharmacological science and it is necessary that any change in the
pharmacology should be adequately analyzed and tested to ensure that
constitutional executions are maintained. A review is required of the
established scientific methodologies and data results for determining the
reliability of the State’s propositions, and to highlight any findings
concerning new drug limitations. As we will see, the scrutiny of the new
pharmacology reached the state and federal courts, but the extent to which a
transparent evaluation is achieved will depend upon the judiciary adopting
sound investigative methodologies.
Before we engage with Oklahoma’s assessment of the new
pharmacology in the incorporation of midazolam to replace sodium
thiopental in the protocol, it is useful to consider the utility of the scientific
methodologies of atomism and holism, and the adjudicative guidelines for
the courts via the Federal Rules of Evidence (hereinafter “FRE”). The
judge’s understanding of both scientific methodology and the legislative
directions is fundamentally important for uncovering sound pharmacology
and, in this instance, whether midazolam is an appropriate drug for lethal
injection.
A. The Atomistic and Holistic Review of Scientific Evidence
When considering scientific evidence, the judge (as legal fact finder) is
confronted with the need to understand the variables in the scientific
methodology and data. Jennifer Mnookin reasons that the process becomes
“one of interpretive convention, intuition and common sense,” which is left
fundamentally to the court’s discretion, “framed primarily by the judges’
inchoate and instinctive sense of how best to proceed.”119 The judge

for Law and Ethics, supra note 109, at 12-18 (reviewing the early history of lethal injection
in Oklahoma).
118. See id.
119. Mnookin, supra note 20, at 1528. In 2009, the National Research Council of
the National Academies stated,
Scientists continually observe, test, and modify the body of knowledge. Rather
than claiming absolute truth, science approaches truth either through
breakthrough discoveries or incrementally, by testing theories repeatedly. . . .
Typically, experiments or observations must be conducted over a broad range
of conditions before the roles of specific factors, patterns, or variables can be
understood.
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initiates two important interpretive approaches in reviewing the science:
these are classified through atomistic or holistic methodologies. An
atomistic framing of the scientific testimony occurs when judges consider
the “prejudice and probative value of [the evidence] taken by itself,” and a
holistic weighing occurs when judges “evaluate both prejudice and
probative value within a broader context . . . taking into consideration the
other evidence adduced in the case.”120
To approach the “truth” of a scientific claim there is often an interpretive
frisson 121 between the atomistic and holistic approaches. In an example of
atomism, when the State applies a scientific perspective, it may only
represent doing science in a confined box. The petitioner, however, may
then present an alternative viewpoint, but again it may only represent
science in a certain context. Hence, both the State and the petitioner have
provided confined viewpoints, which in many ways may appear opposed to
one another. An atomistic interpretation occurs when a singular perspective
of the science is privileged, relied upon, and then used to inform a legal
judgment. It is viewed in isolation and the alternative perspective on the
science is rejected without any clear methodology and extraction of data
interpretation explaining why. If the methodology and data variables are
reviewed together, the adjudicative assessment may provide a holistic
perspective placing the various scientific opinions on a wider interpretive
horizon. The scientific nuances can produce more than two viewpoints and
can reveal a need for a sensitive balancing of issues using all reasonably
applicable methodology and data variables. It may be revealed in the
litigation that one perspective is more accurate than another or that there is
a resultant methodological flaw or data lacuna, which demonstrates that
further testing is required.
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 112 (2009).
120. Mnookin, supra 20, at 1526. (Jennifer Mnookin identified that when a judge weighs
the probative value of expert submissions, she can view each proposition in isolation in an
“atomistic” investigation, but there is a danger that such an approach can be overly
subjective, and have an appearance of bias to the detriment of heterogeneous outcomes. Id.
at 1563-64. In utilizing this approach, there is an enhanced opportunity for the privileging of
one scientific methodology and/or data over another. Alternatively, each aspect of scientific
methodology and data can be placed within a “holistic” review, in a value-neutral analysis,
and then all evidence can be viewed through the solidity of an encompassing consideration.
In a holistic approach to science there is a greater opportunity for identifying the necessity
for further testing to understand data variables. See id.)
121. See Sarah L. Cooper, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court Responses
to Developments in Forensic Science, 33 PACE L. REV. 234, 238-39, 301 (2013).
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As the judge may select the methodology which he or she deems
appropriate, a potential arises for the adjudicative process to lead to what
Deborah Hussey Freeland identifies as scientific “over-claiming.” 122 The
danger is that there can be an adjudicative misrepresentation of scientific
principles by the judge failing to apply the nuances of reasoning and error
rates within methodologies and data findings. The law can achieve this by
framing the science within seemingly compact homogenous (legal) proofof-concept. For example, if the capital judicial system seeks to promote the
Herrera v. Collins standard of the “need for finality in capital cases,” 123
there is a danger that the rendering of an execution in service to the interests
of finality can be facilitated through an adoption of atomism, over holism,
in science. An atomistic approach can more readily facilitate finality, as
science can be (incorrectly) perceived to provide mechanisms for
expediency in sentencing. The danger is that a judicial reductio ad
absurdum of science will place a veneer of legitimacy over prima facie,
irredeemable, barbaric consequences within executions. It is here that the
role of the judge as “scientific gatekeeper” becomes fundamentally
important for the realization of accurate science in maintaining
constitutionally permissible punishment.
B. The Role of the Judge as Scientific “Gatekeeper”
To help manage the parameters of judicial discretion in the review of
science in the courtroom, guidelines have been created which are to be
applied to the presented assessment methodology and data findings. The
primary legislative provision is Rule 702 of the FRE, as amended in 2000,
which establishes that a witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may supply expert
analysis in the form of a written submission and/or oral testimony, if (a) the
expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b)
the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.124
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 125 the Supreme Court
held that under the FRE, the trial judge “must ensure that any and all

122.
123.
124.
125.

Hussey Freeland, supra note 8, at 538.
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993).
FED. R. OF EVID. 702.
509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
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scientific testimony or evidence is not only relevant, but reliable,” 126 and
the “adjective ‘scientific’ implies a grounding in the methods and
procedures of science.” 127 The Court explained that “scientific knowledge”
means more than “subjective belief or unsupported speculation,” 128 and so
it is expected that supportable scientific methodology and data is to be
identified as probative. The Supreme Court subsequently solidified this
adjudicative function by providing procedural protection for the judge’s
decisions. For example, in General Electrical Co. v. Joiner it was held that
the “judge’s determinations regarding the admissibility of expert testimony
were to be reviewed only for abuse of discretion.” 129 This review standard
for the “scientific expert” was then extended to all experts in Khumo Tire
Co. v. Carmichael. 130 Cassandra Welch argues that the general application
of the Daubert trilogy (Daubert, Joiner, and Khumo) will be an exercise of
“deferential review” in which the legal fact finder will be provided
extensive latitude. 131 This corpus of cases was designed to provide courts a

126. Id. at 589.
127. Id. at 590.
128. Id. In applying Rule 702, Daubert overruled Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye created the standard of review in which a judges’ discretion was
significantly curtailed by the weight of the scientific evidence, requiring judges determining
the admissibility of scientific evidence to be sufficiently convinced that the testimony had
“gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” Id. at 1014. Some
scholars have argued that an unreasonably high evidentiary burden was created which
unjustifiably prevented decision-makers from considering new scientific data or
methodologies which could aid the decision making process. Concerning the restrictive
perspective, Judge Harvey Brown has argued:
The Frye test was criticized because the newness of a scientific theory does not
necessarily reflect its unreliability, “nose counting” of the scientific community
could be difficult and unhelpful, and the standard delays the admissibility of
new evidence simply because the scientific community has not had adequate
time to accept the new theory.
Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUSTON L. REV. 743, 779 (1999). See
generally Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471 (2005).
129. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (establishing that “abuse of
discretion is the proper standard by which to review a district court’s decision to admit or
exclude scientific evidence”).
130. 527 U.S. 137, 138 (1999) (establishing the review standard for all experts presenting
evidence to the courts).
131. Cassandra H. Welch, Note, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert’s
Legacy of Confusion, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1085, 1089-90 (2006).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

574

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:545

case management function with a significant degree of deference, 132 which
clearly raises the bar for any litigant claiming that the court was incorrect
on the science. For the purpose of this article, any claims that the judge
misapplied the pharmacological science to maintain an execution in an
example of abuse of judicial discretion will be a high hurdle to get over.133
The Advisory Committee to the Amendments of the FRE (2000)
provided additional observations on Rule 702. 134 The Advisory Committee
drew from case law to highlight evidentiary principles for identifying
relevant and sufficiently reliable expert testimony, which included whether
experts are proposing written and/or oral evidence about findings emerging
naturally out of their research and whether such matters were conducted
independent of the litigation. The court should identify if the expert has
formulated his or her opinions specifically for the purposes of the judicial
proceedings 135 or has provided any unjustifiable extrapolation from
scientific opinion,136 and whether the expert has adequately accounted for
obvious alternative explanations. 137 The Advisory Committee also
identified that the expert should provide the same caution and depth of
analysis as he or she would to his or her regular professional work outside
consulting contracts, and the field of expertise should be known to reach
reliable results for the type of opinion the expert will give. 138 The Daubert
132. David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity: Managing
Scientific Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893, 920-21 (2013); see
David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 28, 66 (2013) (arguing that the additional provisions to the
adjudicative role that a judge conducts means that “Rule 702 not only codifies revolutionary
changes in the substantive law, but also places substantial new demands on judges by
requiring a far more managerial role for judges than they are used to assuming in the
American adversarial system”).
133. Megan J. Ryan, Finality and Rehabilitation, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 121, 121
(2014) (describing the doctrine of finality as creating a “high hurdle for individuals to
overcome”).
134. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments.
135. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
136. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146 (stating that in some cases a trial court “may conclude that
there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered”).
137. The Advisory Committee referred to Claar v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 29
F.3d 499, 500 (9th Cir. 1994), which included testimony where the expert failed to consider
other obvious causes for the plaintiff's condition and Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d
129, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1996), where the possibility of some non-eliminated causes presents a
question of weight, so long as the most obvious causes have been considered and reasonably
ruled out by the expert. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments.
138. The 2009 Report of the National Research Council engaged with the Daubert
interpretation of Rule 702 and observed that the Supreme Court provided guidance for the
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decision affirmed that in applying these principles to determine the
admissibility of scientific evidence, the adversarial system would provide
“[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof” for “attacking shaky but
admissible evidence.” 139 The judge utilizes this judicial guidance because
Rule 702 is a “flexible one,” 140 but it is not “a ‘free-for-all’ in which
befuddled juries [or judges] are confounded by absurd and irrational
pseudoscientific assertions.” 141
The challenge for the State was to adequately demonstrate that the
execution protocol was not informed by absurd and irrational
pseudoscientific assertions and that the pharmacology used by the
Oklahoma Department of Corrections rendered a constitutionally
permissible punishment. To determine this, the District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma needed to apply the abovementioned
scientific methodology and FRE and Daubert standards to the assessment
of Oklahoma’s execution protocol. The court focused particularly on the
State’s (seemingly unusual) claims that midazolam can render anesthetic
properties, whereas the pharmaceutical industry recognizes that the drug is
in the benzodiazepine class commonly used as a sedative and for treating
different manifestations of anxiety. 142 A significant fact for the proceedings

trial judge to consider: (a) whether the scientific theory or mechanism had been tested; (b)
whether the expert’s propositions had been subject to peer review; (c) any error rate of the
scientific technique; (d) any procedural standards controlling the mechanism’s operation;
and, (e) the technique’s acceptance within the scientific community. See NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., supra note 119, at 91.
139. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (citation omitted).
140. Id. at 594.
141. Id. at 595-96. Bernstein argues that there is a need to “exclude expert testimony
when experts cannot point to objective support for their conclusions, and instead intend to
ask the trier of fact to trust their unconfirmed judgment. And that is precisely what Rule 702
accomplishes.” Bernstein, supra note 132, at 69-70. Hussey Freeland states that scientific
researchers should meet a minimum threshold of scientific professional norms to formulate
what she terms the “epistemological quality” of the scientific research through careful
application of appropriate scientific methodologies. Hussey Freeland, supra note 8, at 292.
The flexibility of the interpretive approach allows the court to decide on how best to
evaluate scientific evidence. In practice, however, the Honorable William Giacomo has
argued that “Rule 702[] is not a foolproof or error-free standard.” William J. Giacomo,
Scientific Proof: The Court’s Role as Gatekeeper for Admitting Scientific Expert Testimony,
N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., June 2014, at 23, 25.
142. See Drug Fact Sheet: Benzodiazepines, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., https://www.
dea.gov/druginfo/drug_data_sheets/Benzodiazepines.pdf (last visited May 12, 2017).
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was that use of midazolam to act as an anesthetic in the death penalty had
not been previously investigated through pharmacological trials.
IV. The District Court’s Evidentiary Hearing in Warner v. Gross
The evidentiary hearing of the district court in Warner v. Gross 143
provided a potential fertile stage for determining the science and the legal
boundaries of Oklahoma’s execution protocol. 144 In an attempt to promote
legitimate state comity and finality interests to attain a constitutional
execution, Oklahoma revised its execution protocol with the (then) most
recent amended version being on June 30, 2015. 145 There are four chemical
charts (Charts A-D), which the Director of the Department of Corrections
can select from for designating the specific drugs to be administered. 146
Chart D was chosen for the executions of Charles Warner and Richard
Glossip, which set out the three-drug protocol of midazolam, vecuronium
bromide, and potassium chloride. 147
In Chart D, the State’s intended use of midazolam is as an anesthetic to
induce and maintain a surgical plane of unconsciousness.148 Following the
initial injection, it allows the administration of vecuronium bromide to
cause paralysis 149 and then the noxious stimuli of potassium chloride to

143. Warner, No. CIV 14-0665-F, 2014 WL 7671680 (W.D. Okla., Dec. 22, 2014).
144. Okla. Dep’t of Corrections, supra note 6.
145. Id.
146. Attachment D to Okla. Dep’t of Corrections, supra note 6, at 34 [hereinafter
Attachment D] (follow hyperlink “Attachment D” to access charts). Chart A establishes a
one-drug protocol with pentobarbital; Chart B establishes a one-drug protocol with sodium
pentothal; Chart C is reserved; and Chart D establishes a three-drug protocol with the use of
midazolam, vecuronium bromide, and potassium chloride. Id. at 2-4. Paragraph D “Choice
of Chemicals,” states, “The director shall have sole discretion as to which chemicals shall be
used for the scheduled execution. This decision shall be provided to the offender in writing
ten (10) calendar days prior to the scheduled execution date.” Id. at 3.
147. See Attachment D, supra note 146, at 3. The section on midazolam states: “Syringes
1A and 2A shall each have a dose of 250 milligrams [of] midazolam for a total dose of 500
milligrams. Each syringe containing midazolam shall have a green label which contains the
name of each chemical, the chemical amounts and the designated syringe number.” Id.
148. As will be reviewed in detail below, the State’s use of midazolam as an anesthetic in
the execution protocol was significantly questioned and the leading pharmacological study
on the drug identifies that it has insufficient analgesic properties. See infra Part VI; see also
Reves et al., supra note 23, at 318.
149. See Vecuronium Bromide, DAILYMED, https://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/
drugInfo.cfm?setid=d3b851af-f8e9-4375-bbbe-7132e66ee0d0 (last updated July 21, 2011).
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trigger a cardiac arrest to render the death of the prisoner.150 This process is
designed by the State to attempt to inflict the minimal, if not eradicated,
sensation of pain in the execution. On April 29, 2014, Clayton Lockett was
the first Oklahoma inmate to be executed using the new protocol, but there
were problems with the administration and the functioning of midazolam. 151
The execution occurred following numerous failed attempts to establish the
IV line. 152 After the suspension of the execution and then the surgical
insertion of the needle into Lockett’s groin, he demonstrated consciousness
by verbally complaining about the noxious effects of the drugs, and he
physically struggled on the gurney before dying. 153 The traumatic events of
the execution were reported globally. 154
Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin issued Executive Order 2014-11 to
appoint Mr. Michael Thompson, the Department of Public Safety
Commissioner, to conduct an independent review of the events surrounding
Lockett’s execution. 155 On September 16, 2014, the “Executive
Summary” 156 was published, adopting recommendations for improving
Oklahoma’s execution protocol.157 The Commissioner’s findings focused
150. See Potassium Chloride, DAILYMED, https://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/drug
Info.cfm?setid=333d672c-44bf-4544-bf8c-f6f72f3dfefe (last updated Aug. 31, 2006).
151. Erik Eckholm, One Execution Botched, Oklahoma Delays the Next, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/04/Oklahoma/361414/.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Stern, The Cruel and Unusual Execution of Clayton Lockett,
ATLANTIC, June 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/06/executionclayton-lockett/392069/; Markus Feldenkirchen, Botched Execution: The Death that Could
Kill Lethal Injection, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.spiegel.de/
international/world/execution-of-clayton-lockett-and-the-flaws-of-lethal-injection-a-9923
59.html; Katie Fretland, Scene at Botched Oklahoma Execution of Clayton Lockett Was “a
Bloody Mess,” GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/
13/botched-oklahoma-execution-clayton-lockett-bloody-mess; Josh Sanburn, 25 Secret
Minutes Inside Oklahoma’s Execution Chamber, TIME (May 1, 2014), http://time.com/827
87/oklahoma-botched-execution-clayton-lockett-lethal-injection-problems/; Paige Williams,
Witness to a Botched Execution, NEW YORKER, (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/
news/news-desk/witnesses-to-a-botched-execution.
155. See OKLA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, THE EXECUTION OF
CLAYTON D. LOCKETT: CASE NUMBER 14-0189SI 2 [hereinafter EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF
EXECUTION OF CLAYTON LOCKETT]. This document is available online through the Death
Penalty Information Center at http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/LockettInvestigation
Report.pdf.
156. Id.
157. Governor Fallin’s Executive Order 2014-11 stated that the DPS review must
include:
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on rectifying the identified difficulties, including procedures for locating
appropriate veins for IV insertion, the maintenance of execution equipment,
and the training of the execution teams (including the Restraint Team and
the IV Team). 158 The three substances identified by the Oklahoma statute in
Chart D were left unchanged following the acceptance of the
pharmacological composition and the State’s claimed biological effects on
those injected, as the Executive Summary stated:
This investigation could not make a determination as to the
effectiveness of the drugs at the specified concentration and
volume. They were independently tested and found to be the
appropriate potency as described. The IV failure complicated the
ability to determine the effectiveness of the drugs. 159
This review was insufficient to determine the appropriateness of the
execution drugs. Therefore, the evidentiary questions before the district
court in Warner centered on deconstructing the pharmacology of
midazolam and the rationale for Oklahoma adopting this substance to
render an anesthetic state. 160 Following the inadequate pharmacological
assessment in the Executive Summary, it was revealed three fundamental
components of the drug were still to be analyzed: (a) whether midazolam
has a ceiling effect; (b) the extent to which the drug renders an analgesic
effect; and (c) whether those injected with the drug will experience
paradoxical reactions.
A. Does Midazolam Have a Ceiling Effect?
In the district court’s evidentiary hearing, Judge Friot weighed the expert
testimony within the Daubert “gatekeeper” function. 161 He identified that
[F]irst, an inquiry into the cause of death . . . by a forensic pathologist. Second,
an inquiry into whether the Oklahoma Department of Corrections correctly
followed the agency’s current protocol for executions. Lastly . . . any
recommendations to improve the execution protocol used by the Oklahoma
Department of Corrections.
Okla. Exec. Dep’t, Executive Order No. 2014-11 (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.sos.ok.gov/
documents/executive/942.pdf.
158. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF EXECUTION OF CLAYTON LOCKETT, supra note 155, at 26;
see OKLA. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 6, at 8-10, 20, 22, 26.
159. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF EXECUTION OF CLAYTON LOCKETT, supra note 155, at 24.
160. See infra Section IV.A.1.
161. Court’s Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 36-40, Warner v.
Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F (W.D. Okla. Dec 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415 [hereinafter
Court’s Preliminary Injunction Ruling]. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
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appropriate submissions would be a “product of application of that
expertise” and that an expert should use “recognized and supportable
methodologies” with recourse to “adequate data which is rationally tied” to
the pharmacology of midazolam. 162 Judge Friot heard evidence from the
State’s expert, Dr. Roswell Evans, 163 and the petitioners’ experts, Dr. David
Lubarsky 164 and Dr. Larry Sasich. 165 Mr. John Hadden of the Oklahoma
Attorney General’s Office questioned Dr. Evans, who stated in oral
testimony that midazolam is “primarily used as a drug to induce anesthesia,
to actually facilitate minor procedures and decrease[] apprehension, [and]
also [to] decrease[] memory of the event.” 166 While the inducing of an
unconscious state may occur in minor procedures, Dr. Lubarsky provided a
nuanced articulation of the pharmacological properties in his report for the
district court 167 and stated that the FDA had not approved midazolam for
invasive procedures (such as for an execution) because it is “not sufficient
to produce a surgical plane of anesthesia in human beings.”168 Dr. Sasich

Circuit, the circuit that Judge Friot is under, affirmed in Goebel that this interpretive function
“requires the judge to assess the reasoning and methodology underlying the expert’s opinion,
and determine whether it is scientifically valid and applicable to a particular set of facts.”
Goebel v. Denver and Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 1083, 1087 (2000).
162. Court’s Ruling Preliminary Injunction at 38, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F
(W.D. Okla. Dec 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415. Judge Friot held the Daubert assessment of
reliability is a
determination of whether the conclusions to be expressed by an expert
possessed of the necessary qualifications in the relevant field are the product of
application of that expertise using recognized and supportable methodologies
on the basis of adequate data which is rationally tied to the opinions which
purport to be based on that data.
Id.
163. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 630, Warner
v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).
164. Id. at 102.
165. Id. at 333-35.
166. Id. at 631.
167. Expert Report of David A. Lubarsky at 2, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665F (W.D.
Okla. Dec. 22, 2014) (“Midazolam is known under the trade name Versed. It is the shortest
acting benzodiazepine on the market. Benzodiazepines are a class of drugs primarily used
for treating anxiety”). He affirmed this in oral testimony. Transcript of Preliminary
Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 105, 114, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665F
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).
168. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 107, Warner
v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).
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corroborated this alternative scientific viewpoint in his report to the court
and in oral testimony. 169
To investigate the contested issues further, the experts considered
whether if midazolam was not an anesthetic in the normal dose, an
exponential dose of 500mg (which is over 100 times the normal therapeutic
dose used in surgical procedures 170) could induce an anesthetic effect. In
language approaching a value judgment amounting to certainty in science,
Dr. Evans stated that it “will render the person unconscious and insensate
during the remainder of the [execution] procedure,” 171 and “the proper
administration of 500 milligrams of midazolam . . . make[s] it a virtual
certainty that any individual will be at a sufficient level of unconsciousness
to resist the noxious stimuli which could occur.”172 Dr. Evans made the
finite claim that there was “no ceiling effect at that level” 173 in the
execution procedure, and that “as you increase the dose of midazolam, it’s a
linear effect, so you’re going to continue to get an impact from higher doses
of the drug.” 174 Drs. Lubarsky 175 and Sasich 176 disagreed and maintained
that there was an effective dose limit to midazolam and the data supported
this proposition. 177 In cross-examination, Dr. Evans provided a modified
response to his previous definitive statement, stating that it “[d]epends on
what [Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich are] referring to. If they’re talking about a
spinal cord, I would tend to say, yes, that’s possible.” 178 However, Dr.
169. Report of Larry D. Sasich, at 3, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665F (W.D. Okla.
Dec. 22, 2014); Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 345,
Warner v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).
170. This massively elevated dose was affirmed during the evidentiary hearing when Mr.
John Hadden of the Attorney General’s Office, directly examined the State expert on the
issue, and Dr. Evans affirmed, “This dose is at least 100 times the normal therapeutic dose.”
Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 635, Warner v.
Gross, (No. CIV-14-665F), 2014 WL 7671680. Depending upon the physiological variables
of the person being executed, the dose will range from 1.5 milligrams to 5 milligrams per
kilogram of weight. Id. at 631-39.
171. Id. at 635.
172. Id. at 648.
173. Id. at 636.
174. Id. at 663.
175. Dr. Lubarsky provided a nuanced explanation and stated the specific criteria and
application of midazolam “[d]oes not block pain impulses coming from different parts of the
body. Meaning things like surgical incision, manipulation of the bowel, injection of caustic
substances. Those would not be blocked.” Id. at 107.
176. Id. at 342.
177. Id. at 107, 342.
178. Id. at 664.
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Lubarsky did not see the relevance of the isolation of the effect to the spinal
cord or on the brain, as midazolam “[d]oes not block pain impulses coming
from different parts of the body,” and so “[w]hat you’re attempting to do
with an execution is provide a surgical plane of anesthesia. Which . . . you
cannot do with midazolam no matter how much you give.” 179
On the issue of midazolam’s anesthetic properties, Judge Friot observed,
“[a]s described by Dr. Sasich and Dr. Lubarsky, midazolam has a ceiling
effect which prevents an increase in dosage from having a corresponding
incremental effect on anesthetic depth.”180 Dr. Evans’s testimony, however,
was recognized as probative for the judicial reasoning, as the judge claimed
he “testified persuasively, in substance, that whatever the ceiling effect of
midazolam may be with respect to anesthesia,” it is confined to the “spinal
cord level.” 181 Even though Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich testified that the
ceiling effect was not anatomically confined, 182 the district court privileged
the uncorroborated testimony of Dr. Evans to make this legal decision. The
court appeared to sideline the alternative science without providing any
sound methodological reasons why. 183 Judge Friot maintained that the issue
of the ceiling effect in the spinal cord was “unknown” but then in seeming
inconsistency stated that “[t]he proper administration of midazolam . . .
would make it a virtual certainty that any individual will be at a sufficient
level of unconsciousness to resist the noxious stimuli.”184 It is difficult to
understand as a principle of science that, on one hand, the identification of
the ceiling effect is unknown, and on the other hand, a sufficient level of the
drug can be identified.

179. Id. at 107, 125.
180. Court’s Ruling Preliminary Injunction at 43, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415.
181. Id.
182. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 345, Warner
v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).
183. Court’s Ruling Preliminary Injunction at 43, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415. Judge Friot proceeded to state in absolute
terms:
[T]here is no ceiling effect with respect to the ability of a 500 milligram dose of
midazolam to effectively paralyze the brain, a phenomenon which is not
anesthesia but does have the effect of shutting down respiration and eliminating
the individual’s awareness of pain. The dosage at which the ceiling effect may
occur at the spinal cord level is unknown because no testing to ascertain the
level at which the ceiling effect occurs has been documented.
Id.
184. Id. at 42.
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B. Does Midazolam Have an Analgesic Effect?
The experts further disagreed on the second pharmacological property of
whether midazolam has an “analgesic effect” and will thus inhibit the
sensation of the painful stimuli during the execution. Midazolam affects the
chemical binding of the gamma-aminobutyric acid (“GABA”) receptors,
which inhibits the flow of electrical impulses in the neurons in the central
nervous system. According to Dr. Evans, this inhibiting function would
“prevent the reaction, the painful stimuli.”185 Dr. Lubarsky provided a
distinguishing point on GABA activity: although midazolam does bind to
GABA receptors to induce unconsciousness, “it does not have any effect to
produce deep anesthetic states.”186 The petitioner’s experts affirmed that
potassium chloride’s noxious stimuli to render death pulls the inmate out of
unconsciousness so that he possesses sentience and experiences
excruciating pain. In his report, Dr. Sasich went further when he stated that
“midazolam increases the perception of pain” and that GABA “receptor
agonists such as midazolam have been shown to enhance pain.”187
If midazolam is ineffective, its failure will be obscured by the
vecuronium bromide, which paralyzes the prisoner and renders him unable
to convey the trauma that is occurring within his body to those witnessing
the execution. Dr. Lubarsky affirmed in his report that “[t]he only purpose
of the administration of the vecuronium bromide is to make the execution
more aesthetically pleasing to observers in that it reduces the ability of the
individual being executed to move or show any pain associated with the
execution process.” 188 Even in the presence of this deprecating observation,
185. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 345, 2014 at
648, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).
186. Dr. Evans affirmed in oral examination, “Midazolam attaches to GABA receptors,
inhibiting GABA.” Id. at 637. Further, Dr. Evans indicated a 500mg dose of midazolam will
inhibit GABA with the result being that the condemned “[w]ould not sense the pain.” Id. at
640.
187. Expert Report of Larry D. Sasich, supra note 169, at 4 (citing M.A. Frolich et al.,
Effect of Sedation on Pain Perception, 118 ANESTHESIOLOGY 611 (2013)).
188. Expert Report of David A. Lubarsky, supra note 169, at 4. In considering the State
of Oklahoma’s use of vecuronium bromide, Austin Sarat is apposite here when he stated that
science in executions “mediates between the state and death by masking physical pain and
allowing citizens to imagine that state killing is painless.” AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE
KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN CONDITION 64 (2001). According to
Timothy Kaufman-Osborn, the state’s quixotic maintenance of lethal injection is contingent
upon the administration of effective pharmacological substances to render a body “that does
not writhe uncontrollably, that does not emit unseemly noises, that does not jettison nasty
fluids,” in order to ensure against any claims of barbarism inherent within executions.
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however, the complex issue of the analgesic effect for pain relief was
swiftly dispensed within Judge Friot’s finding that in the administration of
the exponential dose (of 500mg), there will be an elimination of the
“individual’s awareness of pain.” 189 This finding on the phenomenon of
pain is difficult to reconcile with the science. There was an insufficient
engagement with the claim that midazolam has a weak effect as a receptor
agonist and thus chemically contributes to increased pain perception of the
noxious effects of the potassium chloride. The vecuronium bromide will
primarily mask the presence of the internal trauma and thus make opaque
the failure of midazolam to act as an anesthetic. This part of the judgment
provided a substandard application of scientific methodology to interpret
the data presented to the court and does not adequately reveal why the
adverse reactions identified by Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich, would not occur.
C. Does Midazolam Produce Paradoxical Reactions?
The third pharmacological issue centered on the possibility that
midazolam could induce a “paradoxical effect,” in that the drug does not
work as intended. Dr. Sasich stated that “the professional product label for
midazolam warns of paradoxical reactions.”190 Dr. Lubarsky affirmed that
these reactions occurred in “vulnerable populations,” which includes “the
elderly, people with a history of aggression, impulsivity, alcohol abuse or
other psychiatric disorders,” and “it manifest[s] in many ways such as
hyperactivity and restlessness.” 191 What is most damning for Oklahoma’s
use of an exponential dose of 500mg is that when paradoxical reactions
occur, they are “not attended by the expected sedative effects,” but “are
addressed by reversal of midazolam, not further administration.” 192 Thus it
TIMOTHY V. KAUFMAN-OSBORN, FROM NOOSE TO NEEDLE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
LATE LIBERAL STATE 182 (2005).
189. Court’s Ruling Preliminary Injunction at 43, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415.
190. Expert Report of Larry D. Sasich, supra note 169, at 4. The Professional Product
Label for Midazolam states:
Reactions such as agitation, involuntary movements (including tonic/clonic
movements and muscle tremor), hyperactivity and combativeness have been
reported in both adult and pediatric patients. These reactions may be due to
inadequate or excessive dosing or improper administration of midazolam;
however, consideration should be given to the possibility of cerebral hypoxia or
true paradoxical reactions.
Id.
191. Expert Report of David A. Lubarsky, supra note 164, at 3.
192. Id. See also Expert Report of Larry D. Sasich, supra note 166, at 5 (citing Carissa E.
Mancuso et al., Paradoxical Reactions to Benzodiazepines: Literature Review and
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is the cessation of the administration of midazolam that would neutralize
cruel manifestations in the punishment, but Oklahoma does the opposite. It
injects more. 193
Judge Friot did identify the risks. However, he went on to state that the
product label for midazolam demonstrates “[t]he likelihood that a
paradoxical reaction will occur in any particular instance is speculative, but
it occurs with the highest frequency in low therapeutic doses. Dr. Evans
estimated that with a low therapeutic dose of midazolam there would be
less than a one percent incidence of a paradoxical reaction.”194 The district
court did not provide a clear explanation as to why Drs. Sasich and
Lubarsky were “speculative” in their reports and testimony, or why Dr.
Evans’s reasoning of an estimation was acceptable. Judge Friot simply
stated it as a fact or as a manifestation of judicial discretion, immunizing
the adjudication from the need to provide a reasonable explanation.
There are significant reasons to argue that even though the district court
cited the FRE and Daubert, it failed to apply adequate review mechanisms
to the Warner evidentiary hearing. 195 It appears that the court paid lip
service to the evidentiary standards without utilizing them in a fair and
evenhanded way. This poses serious questions concerning whether the court
applied an appropriate adjudicative methodology for discerning if
midazolam has a ceiling effect, whether it possesses analgesic properties,
and to what extent it produces paradoxical reactions within the person being
Treatment Options, 24 PHARMACOTHERAPY 1177, 1177-85 (2004); Young Hee Shin et al.,
The Effect of Midazolam Dose and Age on the Paradoxical Midazolam Reaction in Korean
Pediatric Patients, 65 KOREAN J. ANESTHESIOLOGY 9, 9-13 (2013); Chandra R. Rodrigo,
Flumazenil Reverses Paradoxical Reaction with Midazolam, 38 ANESTHESIA PROGRESS 65,
65-68 (1991)).
193. In his report, Dr. Sasich cited peer reviewed scientific investigations on the
paradoxical effect of midazolam and affirmed that in an experiment, “[a]s the total dose of
midazolam increased, symptoms of the paradoxical reaction became worse.” Expert Report
of Larry D. Sasich, supra note 169, at 5.
194. Court’s Ruling Preliminary Injunction at 44, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415 (emphasis added).
195. Such adjudicative resistance is consistent with David Bernstein’s analysis of the
judicial “counterrevolution” to the tightening of the review and admissibility standards under
the FRE and the Daubert-trilogy, and he notes that “many federal courts resisted” these rules
of evidence, and “[a] few sought to retain the old let-it-all-in rules,” Bernstein, supra note
132, at 50. Such courts sought to operate under the preceding guidance of Frye v. United
States, in which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia established the rule for
admissibility as being to “admit[] expert testimony so long as [the] thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.” 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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executed. A review of the flawed scientific methodology by the district
court is provided below.
D. The Scrutiny of the Expert’s Scientific Methodology
At various moments in the Warner evidentiary hearing, the experts
conceded that there was no available data to support the State of
Oklahoma’s claims concerning the drug’s efficacy for lethal injection. By
way of example of this specific lacuna in response to the petitioner’s
scientific findings, Dr. Evans stated that the paradoxical effect would only
occur in one percent of cases, but he stated that “[t]here are really no
studies that I’m aware of” 196 on the paradoxical reaction. Plaintiff’s
counsel, Robin Konrad, questioned Dr. Evans on this claim in crossexamination, and in viewing the possibility of the paradoxical reaction, Dr.
Evans stated, “I don’t think it’s likely to happen.” 197 Ms. Konrad then
asked, “what are you basing your opinion on?” 198 and the answer was that
“it’s basically shutting down the central nervous system.” 199 As Ms. Konrad
was speaking to Dr. Evans’s methodology, she pressed further in this line of
questioning and asked him whether he was aware of the scholarship that
was cited by Dr. Sasich in his report. She pointed Dr. Evans to page five of
Dr. Sasich’s report and asked, “have you reviewed those case studies that
are cited there?” 200 The answer was, “[n]o. No, I have not.” 201 It is clear that
there were significant unanswered questions concerning the complex data
and methodology on the paradoxical reaction. In another example, Ms.
Konrad cross-examined Dr. Evans on the purported ceiling effect and he
answered, “[t]here is no data that suggests that there is or there isn’t.” 202 In
196. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 641, Warner
v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).
197. Id. at 669.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 670. The studies included: Mancuso, supra note 192; Shin, supra note 192;
and Rodrigo, supra note 192.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 664. Similarly, Ms. Konrad asked Dr. Evans, “How do you know how long
would it take for the effects of those drugs [500 milligrams of midazolam and 500
milligrams of hydromorphone] to cause death?” Id. at 666. Dr. Evans answered, “Well, there
really isn’t much concrete data about this.” Id. Dr. Evans later discussed the 500 milligram
dose of midazolam and stated, “I don’t think anyone would be able to sustain life with that
kind of dose on board.” Id. at 667. Ms. Konrad replied, “You say you don’t think, but do you
know? Is there any data to show[?]” Id. The answer was, “No.” Id. Then the question was
asked whether 500 milligrams of midazolam would cause death. Id. Dr. Evans answered:
Only – no, not – yeah, the dose itself, 500 milligrams, there is nothing out there
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providing the court with his data-collection methodology, Dr. Evans stated
that “we’re essentially extrapolating this piece and saying that there is a
linear effect in terms of administration of the drug and the concentrations
you can receive centrally, [and] it makes sense, it’s a logical assumption to
make in this case.” 203
The source of this “extrapolation,” “mak[ing] sense,” and “logical
assumption,” was primarily from the generic information on the Material
Safety Data Sheet 204 and the website, drugs.com, 205 which is a web-based
tertiary resource for providing basic information on drugs to the general
public. For Dr. Evans, these appeared to be reasonable scientific sources
upon which to base his highly complex pharmacological findings in a
capital case. Dr. Sasich is an expert in drug safety information and is a
member of an advisory committee to the FDA. 206 In contrast, he stated that
he would not rely on these generic resources to engage with complex
pharmacology, and concerning drugs.com, 207 Dr. Sasich stated that it uses
“a number of other sources, for instance, Micromedex, Epocrates, [and]
Lexi-Comp. Those publications or those products have been criticized in
the peer-reviewed medical literature for poor editorial policies, including
being out of date and incomplete.”208

in the literature that looks at 500 milligrams. There’s lots of literature to
suggest that lower doses of the drug will cause death, so if we’re essentially
extrapolating this piece and saying there is a linear effect in terms of
administration of the drug and the concentrations you can receive centrally,
then it makes sense, it’s a logical assumption to make in this case.
Id. at 667-68.
203. Id. at 667-68.
204. See MSDS SOLUTIONS CENTER, http://www.msds.com/ (last visited May 12, 2017)
(providing information on the Material Data Safety Sheets).
205. See DRUGS.COM, https://www.drugs.com/ (last visited May 12, 2017); see also
Michael S. Leonard, Justices Uphold Oklahoma Lethal Injection, Tightening Standards for
Death Penalty Plaintiffs, WESTLAW J. HEALTH L., July 7, 2015, 23 No. 03 WJHTH 9.
206. Dr. Sasich stated that his professional experience included “[s]erving as a Consumer
Representative on the Science Board of Food and Drug Administration, an advisory
committee to the FDA Commissioner.” Expert Report of Larry D. Sasich, supra note 169, at
1.
207. Ms. Konrad asked, “Would you rely on a source such as drugs.com?” to which Dr.
Sasich answered, “No, I wouldn’t. And I would probably not accept a work product from a
student that provided me a report where drugs.com was used as the reference source.”
Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 336, Warner v.
Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).
208. Id.
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Dr. Sasich provided the court with a detailed methodology for extracting
information on pharmacology and stated that the “[p]rofessional product
labels” were the appropriate sources of information for determining the
characteristics and usage(s) of a drug because “scientific studies have been
submitted and reviewed by the FDA before any information can actually go
into a professional product label.”209 Dr. Lubarsky agreed with Dr. Sasich’s
observations in oral testimony, 210 and in his report he stated that
“[m]idazolam is not FDA-approved as the sole drug to produce and
maintain anesthesia in minor surgical procedures,” 211 in which he cited a
peer-reviewed article from the journal Anesthesiology to affirm this
proposition. 212 Dr. Evans offered his observations concerning generalized
claims that deaths had resulted from large doses of midazolam, 213 but Dr.
Lubarsky gave a nuanced explanation in oral testimony that “it is a true
statement, but the part that’s left out is that those types of fatalities occur in
90-year-olds with congestive heart failure who have not had careful titration
of the drug.” 214
In his report, Dr. Lubarsky discussed the problems with the executions of
Clayton Lockett in the State of Oklahoma and Joseph Wood in the State of
Arizona as examples of qualitative methodology and data.215 Dr. Lubarsky
identified the procedural complications that the execution team experienced
in establishing venous access and the problems with the chemical effects
within Lockett’s body, and ultimately he found that the use of midazolam
as the first drug in Oklahoma’s execution protocol “creates a significant

209. Id.
210. Dr. Lubarsky testified that midazolam “was not approved by the FDA as a sole
anesthetic because after the use of fairly large doses that were sufficient to reach the ceiling
effect and produce induction of unconsciousness, the patients responded to the surgery.” Id.
at 127.
211. Expert Report of David A. Lubarsky, supra note 167, at 2.
212. Id. at 2-3 (citing Reves et al, supra note 23, at 310-24).
213. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 633, Warner
v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).
214. Id. at 124.
215. Dr. Lubarsky and Dr. Sasich were speaking on behalf of the future pain, as an
example of Timothy Kaufman-Osborn’s observations of “the troublesome role of the human
body in contemporary capital punishment.” KAUFMAN-OSBORN, supra note 188, at 182.
Elaine Scarry is also reflective of the observations (and the role) of the petitioner’s experts
when she stated that “[b]ecause the person in pain is ordinarily so bereft of the resources of
speech, it is not surprising that the language for pain should sometimes be brought into being
by those who are not themselves in pain but who speak on behalf of those who are.” ELAINE
SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD 6 (1985).
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risk of serious harm to condemned prisoners.” 216 On July 23, 2014, Arizona
botched the execution of Joseph Wood.217 Arizona adopted the use of
750mg of midazolam (which is 250mg more than Oklahoma), but the
source of the execution drugs were kept secret and there was insufficient
information on the training of the execution personnel. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted a stay of execution,218 but
the Supreme Court lifted the stay and allowed the secrecy of the Arizona
protocol to remain. 219 Nonetheless, the torturous manifestations of Wood’s
execution emerged and revealed that he was injected fifteen times, he
struggled against the restraints and gasped for air, and it was about one hour
and fifty-seven minutes before he died. 220 In the Warner evidentiary
hearing, Dr. Lubarsky was asked about the effectiveness of 750mg of
midazolam to induce and maintain unconsciousness, and he stated Wood’s
execution in Arizona was
unintentional experimental proof that large doses of midazolam do
not necessarily kill you, make you guarantee unconsciousness, and
that the administration of additional doses do not cause further
depression of consciousness or Mr. Wood would have stopped
breathing and would have gone into a coma were such large doses
are actually effective. 221
It therefore becomes difficult to understand the district court’s selective
reasoning on the pharmacological science for the execution protocol.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Landrigan v. Brewer 222 affirmed the
district court’s finding of an “unconstitutional risk of harm flowing from
the state’s proposed use of drugs from a foreign source that was not
approved by the FDA.” 223 If the probative fact is FDA approval through the
granting of a license (for a foreign or domestically manufactured drug), a
logical application of this rule would be that it prima facie favors Drs.
216. Expert Report of David A. Lubarsky, supra note 167, at 6.
217. Tom Dart, Arizona Inmate Joseph Wood Was Injected 15 Times with Execution
Drugs, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2014 10:40 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/
02/arizona-inmate-injected-15-times-execution-drugs-joseph-wood.
218. Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir. 2014).
219. Ryan v. Wood, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014).
220. Dart, supra note 217.
221. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 130, Warner
v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).
222. 625 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2010).
223. Court’s Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 61, Warner v.
Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415.
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Lubarsky and Sasich, as they were the experts who affirmed that the FDA
had not provided a license for midazolam to be used as an anesthetic in
minor surgical procedures. If the basic question is whether the FDA has
approved midazolam to act as an anesthetic for punishment procedures (for
example, in executions), the answer is “no.” The significance of this lacuna
is strengthened by the Supreme Court’s vacating of stay in Brewer v.
Landrigan, 224 when the Court held that the district court “was left to
speculate as to the risk of harm. But speculation cannot substitute for
evidence that the use of the drug is sure or very likely to cause serious
illness and needless suffering.” 225 If the rule is established that
“speculation” is rendered when an expert provides evidence that a drug will
perform in a way that the FDA has not accepted and thus endorsed through
a license, then it is clear that this applies to the State of Oklahoma’s claim
and not to that of the petitioners. The State was providing the greatest
degree of subjectivity concerning the evidence. The petitioner pointed to
the lacunae.
There are significant grounds for arguing that the district court failed to
adequately apply Rule 702 within the Warner evidentiary hearing, and it is
argued here that (a) the evidence presented did not amount to “sufficient
facts or data;” 226 (b) it did not adhere to the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Joiner, which held that there must not be “too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered;”227 and (c) it did not meet the
Tenth Circuit’s standard from Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co.
that the judge must “assess the reasoning and methodology” of the
scientist’s opinion to “determine whether it is scientifically valid and
applicable.” 228 The district court meandered around the scientific evidence
of Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich and applied judicial reductivism to make the
science fit within the confines of a constitutional death penalty. 229 The court
seemed to adopt a judicial atomistic approach for an “assessment of a piece

224. Brewer v. Landrigan, 562 U.S. 996 (2010) (Mem.).
225. Id. (internal citations omitted).
226. FED. R. EVID. 702(b).
227. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
228. 215 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that Daubert’s gatekeeping function
“requires the judge to assess the reasoning and methodology underlying the expert’s opinion,
and determine whether it is scientifically valid and applicable to a particular set of facts”).
229. The court did so in a way which is consistent with the observations of the moral
philosopher, Mary Midgley, who observed that “reductionism,” imposed by social/political
institutions, is an exercise in, “reshaping [of the] intellectual landscape.” MARY MIDGLEY,
THE MYTHS WE LIVE BY 43 (2011).
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of evidence in a relative vacuum.” 230 The district court committed a “false
positive error,” 231 as it has unjustifiably provided a scientific overstatement
to frame the pharmacology of midazolam and packaged it, cut off the
boundaries of uncertainty 232 affirmed by the absence of an FDA license,
and accepted the State’s speculation to render a death penalty judicially and
legislatively imaginable.
This flawed reasoning, and thus, false comity, is consistent with
Jonathan Maur and Lisa Larrimore Oullette’s study on deference mistakes
by district and appellate courts, and one contributing factor is the
demonstration of a “pro-government” discretion. 233 The district court
applied a subjective management of the science to curtail the probative
elements of the petitioner’s position in order to “restore order” within
Oklahoma’s capital judicial system. 234 The main interpretive mechanism to

230. Mnookin, supra note 20, at 1534.
231. Michael Traynor, Communicating Scientific Uncertainty: A Lawyer’s Perspective,
45 Envtl. L. Rep.: News & Analysis (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10159, 10164 (2015), 45 ENVLRNA
10159 (Westlaw). Traynor stated, “Varying standards of proof bear on the level of tolerable
uncertainty; for example ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ ‘clear and convincing,’ and
‘preponderance of the evidence.’” Id. Professor David Faigman observed (in a personal
communication to Traynor) that
the difference in standards . . . . “relates to the problem of balancing the
likelihood of making false positive errors versus the prospect of making false
negative errors. In criminal cases, the concern is with making false positive
errors, thus resulting in a high burden of proof--and increasing the number of
false negatives as a result.”
Id.
232. Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich attempted to show the District Court that, at a minimum,
there were levels of uncertainty within Oklahoma’s use of midazolam, and at a maximum, it
was clear that torturous executions will be maintained. In presenting this information, the
petitioner’s experts were reliable scientists informing the court of the very real presence of
uncertainty which could reach to a significant probability that Oklahoma is wrong on the
pharmacology of midazolam. According to Kenny Walker, if a scientist “can be accurate yet
still use uncertainty to frame the impact, [they are] not only trustworthy, [they are]
interesting, and…effectively shape the terms of debate. We’ve all got to stop ignoring
uncertainty, and instead learn to manage it.” Kenny Walker, “Without Evidence, There Is No
Answer’: Uncertainty and Scientific Ethos in the Silent Spring(s) of Rachel Carson, 2
ENVTL. HUMANITIES 101, 114 (2013).
233. Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 643, 686 (2015).
234. Masur and Larrimore Oullette note that “deference mistakes are commonplace
in . . . criminal procedure.” Id. at 731. Christina Boyd observes that within the appellate
process, district court judges face potentially the most constraints upon their “decisionmaking behavior,” and that their work can involve “a complex, dynamic case environment
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produce this false comity and the packaging of the pharmacological science
for a manageable judicial expression was through the doctrine of finality.
E. Elevating the Doctrine of Finality to Neutralize Legitimate State Comity
Judge Friot utilized an atomistic privileging of the State’s
uncorroborated reasoning. It is reflective of the opinion of Michael Traynor,
President Emeritus of the American Law Institute, who stated that “lawyers
are experts at proceduralizing and compartmentalizing difficult problems.
The legal system facilitates private ordering as well as the resolution of the
disputes that come within it. Its main purpose is not the pursuit of scientific
‘truth.’” 235 If this procedural observation is correct, and it can be argued
that “scientific truth” was not the primary aim of the district court, then
what was the main purpose or “intention?” 236 It appears that the
adjudicative process adhered to the principle that has prominence at the end
of the Warner judgment. The district court’s citation of the Baze v. Rees
reasoning is telling in that
an inmate cannot succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim
simply by showing one more step the state could take as a failsafe for other independently adequate measures. This approach
would serve no meaningful purpose and would frustrate the
state’s legitimate interest in carrying out a sentence of death in a
timely manner. 237
In affirmation:
Plaintiffs have been successfully prosecuted, convicted, and
sentenced to death in proceedings that have withstood decades of
trials, direct review, and collateral review. The equities of the
that presents multiple decision-making opportunities.” Christina L. Boyd, The Hierarchical
Influence of Courts of Appeals on District Courts, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 114 (2015).
235. Traynor, supra note 231, at 10164 (“In general, courts, legislatures, and the legal
profession attempt in various ways to address and communicate uncertainty, risk,
unreliability, and incomplete information in a changing environment. They must do so
within a system that has various objectives . . . includ[ing]: determining responsibility and
resolving adversarial litigation with finality and transparency…ensuring the participants and
the public a reasonable measure of fairness, acceptability, and predictability.”).
236. Consistent with this observation, Mary Midgley reminds us that “[t]he point is not
just that [there are] ways of simplifying the conceptual scene. It concerns the intention that
underlines that simplification.” Midgley, supra note 229, at 43.
237. Court’s Ruling Preliminary Injunction at 71, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415 (emphasis added) (citing Baze v. Rees, 553
U.S. 35, 60-61 (2008)).
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matter strongly favor bringing their cases at long last to a
conclusion by carrying out the penalty that the courts have
determined to have been constitutionally imposed. 238
Here is the clear interaction of comity and finality. Comity is argued to
have been facilitated through the “equities of the matter,” the “decades of
trials,” and whilst this has suspended finality, it has done so for good
reasons so as to provide an adjudicative process to legitimize state interests
in the execution. Now, comity must give way to finality as “one more step”
cannot be taken. The doctrine of finality is initiated following the comity
review, and it steps in via the judicial declarations of the “timely manner”
and to promote the “state’s legitimate interest” there is a need for a
conclusion in the case. In promoting the finality interests here, the judicial
process is trying to close the door in an attempt to put the petitioners “out of
court and deny[] them the means of further” action. 239
There are significant questions concerning the efficacy of this process
and the court’s framing of the interaction of comity and finality. In making
its assessment on the comity and finality issues, the district court seemingly
conflated the factual predicates of (a) the new judicial consideration of the
pharmacology of midazolam within the amended execution protocol with
(b) the guilt/innocence and sentencing issues of the petitioner’s capital
bifurcated trial in 1997, then direct review, and the eighteen years of further
collateral attack and habeas corpus appeals. There are significant reasons to
believe that the conflation of these issues has led to an abuse of discretion,
as the arguments concerning the change in the pharmacology used in
executions were a novel issue before the court since the amendments to the
Execution Protocol were only adopted in 2014. Therefore, it should have
been kept as a separate issue which would have (reasonably) led to the
determination that new testing of midazolam was required. However, in
furtherance of false comity and an illegitimate application of the doctrine of
finality, the district court cited two Supreme Court decisions:240 Nelson v.
Campbell, in which the Court held that the State has “a significant interest
in meting out a sentence of death in a timely fashion,” 241 and Calderon v.
Thompson, in which the Court held:
238. Id. at 79-80 (emphasis added).
239. KEVIN F. ARTHUR, FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS AND OTHER APPELLATE TRIGGER ISSUES
§ 4 (2014).
240. Court’s Ruling Preliminary Injunction at 80, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415 (citing Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637,
644 (2004); then citing Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998)).
241. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644.
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When lengthy federal proceedings have run their course and a
mandate denying relief was issued, finality acquires an added
moral dimension. Only with an assurance of real finality can the
state execute its moral judgment in a case. Only with real finality
can the victims of crime move forward knowing the moral
judgment will be carried out. To unsettle these expectations is to
inflict a profound injury to the powerful and legitimate interest
in punishing the guilty, an interest shared by the State and the
victims of crime alike. 242
This section of the Calderon judgment is reflective of the bifurcated
capital trial, the lengthy habeas corpus appeals, and the impact of the
litigation on the victims of the crimes. It is not engaging with an evidentiary
hearing considering for the first time an issue focusing on the
constitutionality of the pharmacology used in a new execution protocol.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court affirmed that the doctrine of finality is
fundamentally contingent upon the fulfillment of genuine comity as the
“proceedings [need to] have run their course.”243 Thus, the “moral
dimension” of finality can only be legitimately demonstrated once the
comity interests have been adequately adjudicated, and consequently, “real
finality” can only occur once genuine comity has been completed. The
paradox is that if genuine comity takes its course, it is very likely that the
finality of an execution in Oklahoma will not be upheld. Hence, the district
court has used this citation from Calderon to incorrectly support the State’s
position. 244 The Supreme Court’s intended purpose is to ensure that before
finality in an execution can be imposed, legitimate comity should have
manifested. It hitherto had not occurred in the Warner litigation. Therefore,
due to the lack of sufficient comity consideration by the district court in
Warner, Calderon has been misapplied. Warner demonstrates that, in
various ways, the Oklahoma capital judicial system is failing to implement
constitutional comity review.
Instead of providing a legitimate basis for finality to promote a legitimate
execution, Warner threw open more questions concerning the execution
drugs than it answered. The next court that considered the issues and

242. 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 421 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
243. Id.
244. Court’s Ruling Preliminary Injunction at 80, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV–14–0665–F
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014), 2014 WL 10741415 (citing Calderon v. Thompson 523 U.S.
538, 556 (1998)).
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attempted to provide adequate explanations was the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit.
V. Finality and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
The petitioners filed for a preliminary injunction in the Tenth Circuit on
the grounds that the district court had deferentially abused its discretion. 245
The case considered whether (a) following the Department of Public
Safety’s independent review, there was a substantial risk that midazolam
would be negligently administered; 246 and (b) conducting executions using
the changing array of untested drugs amounted to biological
experimentation.247 The Tenth Circuit reviewed these issues following the
acknowledgment that Clayton Lockett’s execution “though ultimately
successful, was a procedural disaster.” 248 So there were significant reasons
for the court to apply a close reading of the district court’s application of
the FRE and the Daubert assessment concerning the parameters of judicial
discretion.
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the district court’s Daubert proceedings
and stated that under the abuse of discretion standard, the court will
“reverse only if the district court’s conclusion is arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or manifestly unreasonable or when [it is] convinced that the
district court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of
permissible choice in the circumstances.”249 These adjectives for
assessment—“arbitrary” and “capricious,” for example—complement the
245. See Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. 2015). The petitioners were twentyone Oklahoma death row inmates, led by Charles Warner, Richard Glossip, John Grant, and
Benjamin Cole, bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the
State of Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol. Id. at 723.
246. Id. at 727. Chief Judge Briscoe identified the first substantive issue for the Tenth
Circuit to consider was whether “there is a substantial risk that midazolam will, as
exemplified by the Lockett execution, be negligently administered and thus result in an
inmate consciously experiencing the painful effects of the second and third drugs utilized in
the execution protocol.” Id.
247. Id. Chief Judge Briscoe identified the second substantive issue to be determined was
whether the use of midazolam amounted to experimentation on captive human subjects “[b]y
attempting to conduct executions with an ever-changing array of untried drugs of unknown
provenance, using untested procedures, . . . are engaging in a program of biological
experimentation on captive and unwilling human subjects.” Id. (alteration and omission in
original) (citation omitted).
248. Id. at 725.
249. Id. at 733-34 (quoting United States v. Avitia-Guillen, 680 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th
Cir. 2012)).
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analysis of “clear error” and the circumstances “exceeding the boundaries
of permissible choice.” An array of options was affirmed which prima facie
provided for a wide due process review. It would appear that following the
denial of the petitioner’s claims by the district court, the State would have a
higher burden to meet in the Tenth Circuit’s assessment of the State’s
reliance on one pharmacologist’s scantly supported assertions on the
biological effect of midazolam. The presence of the alternative science
placed before it by the petitioner’s two experts, and the scholarly
publications in support of the data rejecting the use of midazolam as an
effective anesthetic, should reasonably have become probative to cast doubt
upon the State’s position. However, a seeming aberrant reasoning occurred.
The Tenth Circuit accepted the State’s expert without a detailed
consideration of the petitioner’s experts, Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich, and it
concluded that Dr. Evans’s “testimony was the product of reliable
principles and methods reliably applied to the facts of this case.” 250 This
reasoning followed the affirmation that “plaintiffs point to what they
perceive as a number of errors in Dr. Evans’s testimony,” and—following
juridical observations on the general legal arguments, but without detailed
engagement with the propositions of science—concluded that “these errors
were not sufficiently serious to render unreliable Dr. Evans’ testimony . . .
or to persuade [the court] that the district court’s decision to admit Dr.
Evan’s testimony amounted to an abuse of discretion.” 251 The court did
recognize that the State’s witness’ possible deficiencies included the
reported toxic dose range of midazolam, the cogency of the assertion that
Material Safety Data Sheets are sufficient for FDA requirements, and the
presence of conflicting expert testimony concerning whether midazolam
inhibits GABA activity. 252 These complex issues, however, were swiftly
dealt with by the Tenth Circuit 253 without any adequately documented
holistic balancing of the alternative viewpoints provided by the petitioners.
The Tenth Circuit’s decision inadequately engaged with the significance
of these errors highlighted by the testimony and reports of Drs. Lubarsky
and Sasich (as detailed in Part IV above). It did not reveal how the
petitioners’ experts were less probative, or how Dr. Evans’s opinions were
of a clearer scientific quality making his methodology and data
authoritative for the appellate reasoning. It is therefore difficult to
understand how the Tenth Circuit’s decision is not arbitrary or a very lax
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 734.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 735.
Id. at 735-36.
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application of the review standards. What we are left with is an atomistic
determination. The Tenth Circuit’s decision galvanized a legal process that
reduces the pharmacological science in curtailing the holistic consideration
for adequately weighing the conflicting testimony of the petitioner’s
experts. 254 This perpetuates the packaging of the science to achieve a
result—in this case, marching the petitioner to the death chamber. Both the
district court and the Tenth Circuit failed to adequately assess the
“underlying reasoning” and “methodology” proscribed by the FRE.
Following this inadequate scientific evaluation, the Tenth Circuit makes
two self-reflective claims concerning the quality of its own review in this
case. The judgment states that “[a]fter carefully examining the record on
appeal, we are unable to say that any of these factual findings are clearly
erroneous,” 255 and in footnote 10, it states that “[i]n an abundance of
caution, this opinion was circulated to all active judges of this court prior to
publication. No judge requested a poll on the questions presented by
plaintiffs.” 256 Considering the volume of expert evidence that the petitioners
presented, it is difficult to accept such qualitative observations on the
court’s own role and performance. It would have benefitted the Tenth
Circuit judgment if an extensive review of the complicated scientific claims
of Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich were set out in the adjudication and clear
reasoning applied as to why their methodology and data was incorrect. This
would have enabled the reader of the judgment to consider a transparent
weighing of the major factors of the scientific claims. Applying a holistic
review of the evidence and the appellate judgment, it is argued that the
Tenth Circuit failed to present the full reach of the competing scientific
claims. An appropriate conclusion of this federal review is that the
judgment was founded upon an overreliance on the State’s one expert and
applying insufficient and underdeveloped scientific propositions, the State’s
position was accepted and affirmed.
Perhaps it could be claimed that the Tenth Circuit’s self-affirmation of its
own (inadequate) methodology is an example of the defensive rhetoric of
Queen Gertrude in Hamlet when she claimed, “The lady doth protest too
much, methinks.” 257 The proclamation of too many vows (solemn promises)
254. Id.
255. Id. at 735.
256. Id. at 736 n.10.
257. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc. 2. The emotional observation is by
Queen Gertrude, who whilst watching the play The Mouse-Trap with Hamlet, provides this
rather defensive line to reveal that she thought that in real life the opposite is true (in this
case too many vows to be kept by a queen to a king). See id. Hamlet has many underlying
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can lead the hearer (or reader) to conclude that in real life, the position is
unrealistic, or in fact, the opposite did, does, or will occur.
The judgement of the Tenth Circuit, however, is not the end of the
matter, as the adjudication reducing the science was challenged in the
Supreme Court in the presence of another example of a torturous execution.
The highest court in the land received the benefit of further supporting
pharmacological evidence of the inappropriateness of midazolam for
executions.
VI. The SCOTUS Decision in Glossip v. Gross
A. The Brief of the Sixteen Professors of Pharmacology as Amicus Curiae
After the completion of the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety’s
investigations 258 and the amendment to Oklahoma’s execution protocol, 259
Charles Warner was executed on January 15, 2015.260 Consistent with the
legal arguments concerning the inadequacy of midazolam filed on his
behalf, he complained that the drug injected into him “feels like acid,” and
then exclaimed, “My body is on fire.” 261 It was clear that further
pharmacological investigations were required to understand the causes of
this internal trauma. An opportunity was supplied in a writ for certiorari
with Richard Glossip as the named first petitioner. In Glossip v. Gross, 262
the Supreme Court received additional expert opinions within various
amicus curiae briefs, 263 including a brief by sixteen professors of

pearls of wisdom for the study of law. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Shakespeare's Laws: A
Justice, a Judge, a Philosopher, and an English Professor, in SHAKESPEARE AND THE LAW: A
CONVERSATION AMONG DISCIPLINES AND PROFESSIONS 301-22 (Bradin Cormack et al. eds.,
2013) (discussing Hamlet). Hence, the claim is made that even though the Tenth Circuit
provided to all of the judges an opportunity to read the case, it does not ipso facto equate to
the affirmation that an accurate reading of the science had occurred. In fact, the argument of
this article is that the opposite is the outcome.
258. See generally EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF EXECUTION OF CLAYTON LOCKETT, supra
note 155.
259. See generally Okla. Dep’t of Corrections, supra note 6.
260. See Warner v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 824 (2015) (denying a stay of Warner’s execution).
261. Katie Fretland, Oklahoma Carries out First Execution Since Botched Execution in
April, GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/16/oklahomaexecutes-charles-warner.
262. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
263. There were twelve amicus curiae briefs filed in Glossip v. Gross. See Glossip v.
Gross, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/glossip-v-gross/ (last
visited March 21, 2017).
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pharmacology filed in support of neither party. 264 This litigant-neutral brief
firmly disagreed with the State’s reasoning concerning the use of
midazolam in the execution protocol as the amici argued:
From a pharmacological perspective . . . [m]idazolam is
incapable of rendering an inmate unconscious prior to the
injection of the second and third drugs in the State of
Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol. Therefore, midazolam is
not appropriate for its intended purpose as the first drug in the
State of Oklahoma’s three-drug lethal injection protocol.265
The amici’s scientific interpretation was contrary to the affirmation of
the protocol within the preceding judicial determinations of the district
court and the Tenth Circuit. They clearly set out the chemical interaction
with the GABA receptors through the identified gradation of drugs as
“agonists,” in that “when a drug activates its receptor . . . to produce a
maximal effect [it] is called a full agonist; one that cannot produce the
maximal effect is called a partial agonist.”266 It was argued that the drug
does not produce a full agonistic inhibiting as “midazolam is only a partial
agonist, and the depth of its inhibitory effect has limits,” and consequently,
the identification of the difference between the agonistic scales reveals how
midazolam has a “ceiling effect.”267 Taken on a holistic basis with the
evidence of the three experts in the district court, it is reasonable to adduce
that the objective, litigant-neutral clarity in the brief of the sixteen
professors would have been persuasive. 268 It was presented to the Supreme
Court as clear and neutral scientific evidence that the inmate would be
sentient and thus experience excruciating pain in the execution process.
This is also consistent with what Charles Warner claimed he was subjected
to during his execution.

264. Brief of Sixteen Professors of Pharmacology as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 111.
265. Id. at 20-21.
266. Id. at 17-18.
267. Id. at 18.
268. It is also consistent with Seema Shah’s reasoning that “risk minimization likely puts
extra scrutiny on particular aspects of execution by lethal injection. For instance, risk
minimization may require Departments of Corrections to stop using the drug midazolam
(which was implicated in three of the four botched executions that occurred in 2014).”
Seema Shah, Experimental Execution, 90 WASH. L. REV. 147, 196-97 (2015).
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B. The Majority Decision on the Pharmacology of Midazolam
1. Justice Alito and the Efficacy of Midazolam
In a five-four split decision, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, wrote the majority
opinion and agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s affirmation of the district
court’s holding on the constitutionality of using midazolam in Oklahoma’s
lethal injection protocol.269 Justice Alito affirmed the efficacy of Dr.
Evans’s testimony that “although midazolam is not an analgesic, it can
nonetheless ‘render the person unconscious and “insensate” during the
remainder of the procedure.’” 270 Justice Alito followed the restrictive
interpretive techniques of the district court and Tenth Circuit in privileging
Dr. Evans’s testimony without providing any scientifically corroborated
evidence that speaks directly to the process for maintaining
unconsciousness. 271 Concerning whether midazolam possesses a ceiling
effect, Justice Alito stated that “[p]etitioners provided little probative
evidence on this point, and the speculative evidence that they did present to
the District Court does not come close to establishing that its factual
findings were clearly erroneous.” 272 There is no judicial explanation why
Dr. Evans’s “propositions” were not speculative and why his evidence was
immunized against effective FRE peer-review standards. However, it does
not change the fact that the State’s position is contrary to Drs. Lubarsky and
Sasich’s interpretation of the complex pharmacology, which is underpinned
by the findings of the amicus curiae brief of the sixteen professors of
pharmacology. 273 Justice Alito inadequately engaged with the testimony
and expert reports and did not provide a reasonable deconstruction of the
“speculative evidence.” 274 This reveals the dangers set by the district court
269. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2730-31 (2015).
270. Id. at 2741 (citation omitted).
271. See id. at 2736.
272. Id. at 2743 (arguing that “Dr. Sasich stated in his expert report that the literature
‘indicates’ that midazolam has a ceiling effect, but he conceded that he ‘was unable to
determine the midazolam dose for a ceiling effect on unconsciousness because there is no
literature in which such testing has been done’”).
273. See supra Section VI.A.
274. The significant body of medical opinion which is against the District Court’s
decision has resulted in what the Honorable William J. Giacomo observed as the possibility
of courts “admitting scientific testimony which is nonetheless unreliable or disputed in the
scientific community.” Giacomo, supra note 141, at 24-25. Cassandra Welch’s observation
of the quality of review is apposite, in that “under the Daubert trilogy, courts are free to use
a flexible approach for all expert testimony in analyzing whether the proffered testimony is
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precedent of an overstatement in science and it is subsequently very
difficult to achieve an overruling of this initial reductive decision.
The dissymmetry in favor of the State did not end there. The majority
opinion also negated the probative value of the absence of the FDA license
and only referred to the FDA in a citation by Dr. Sasich. 275 Such
adjudication is indicative of the disconcerting reasoning in Heckler v.
Chaney, in which the Supreme Court refused to mandate that the FDA
should “exercise its enforcement power to ensure that States only use drugs
that are ‘safe and effective’ for human execution.”276 Heckler held that the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act could not be interpreted to extend the FDA’s
role in regulating drugs trials—including those on prisoners and
veterinarians putting animals to death—to the state use of pharmacology in
the death penalty. 277 Such reasoning is an example that the underlying
evidentiary vicissitudes are ultimately framed within an adjudicative
process in which the courts, not the FDA, have the monopoly review.
Timothy Kaufman-Osborn argued that the Heckler decision “appears to
censure a specific way of taking life.”278 We are left with the very
unsatisfactory position where “the administrative agency authorized to
protect persons from dangerous drugs” 279 is not the institution that
ultimately determines what is the appropriate pharmacology for use in the
lethal injection process. The states and the courts can thus maintain an
opaque covering over the torturous ending of life.
2. Justice Alito on Scientific Methodology
Justice Alito privileged for assessment the importance of the improved
execution technology and procedures as “the Oklahoma protocol featured
numerous safeguards, including the establishment of two IV access sites”
and “confirmation of the viability of those sites.”280 The amicus curiae brief
of the sixteen professors did not see the issue of the procedures
implementing the execution techniques and technologies (for example,
those of the Restraint Team and IV Team) as determinative, because to the
reliable knowledge,” and it appears that the majority have adhered to the rule that “lower
courts are insulated from rigorous review by the abuse of discretion standard, which is
applied in all determinations of whether an expert should be allowed to testify.” Welch,
supra note 131, at 1090-91.
275. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2742 n.5.
276. 470 U.S. 821, 827 (1985).
277. See id. at 823, 837-38.
278. KAUFMAN-OSBORN, supra note 188, at 204.
279. Id.
280. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2736.
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amici the foundational question for this litigation concerned the chemical
composition of midazolam and its biological effects.281 So the important
question was not how to get midazolam into the body, but what happens
once it is injected. On this issue, the majority opinion was focused upon the
wrong aspect of the execution.
In further unsound methodology, Justice Alito sought to textually
diminish the petitioner’s position by classifying their legal and scientific
arguments as “little more than a quibble about the wording chosen by Dr.
Evans” and as “simply quarrelling with the words that Dr. Evans used.” 282
Here, Justice Alito engaged with the arguments over midazolam’s ceiling
effect and the inhibiting of the GABA receptors.283 As a principle of
science, it is difficult to understand this etymological critique of the
petitioners’ “words” used in their argument. In fact, this “quibble” was an
engagement with the fundamental pharmacological questions, because
following the clarification on the impact within the GABA receptors, the
inhibiting function of midazolam is classified as only a partial agonist as
opposed to a full agonist for an anesthetic effect. 284 There is a real
possibility that a surgical plane of unconsciousness will not be
maintained.285 It is reasonable to state that the Supreme Court’s majority
opinion undermined the methodological approaches of the “responsible
scientist” on the anesthetic effect, and instead provided a way for law to
manipulate scientific research on this important issue.286 In the evidentiary
hearing, a holistic reading would prima facie demonstrate that the
responsible scientific methodology, presentation of data, and identification
of lacunae, came from the petitioners. Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich were the
281. See Brief of Sixteen Professors of Pharmacology as Amici Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 111, at 10-11.
282. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2744.
283. Id.
284. See Brief of Sixteen Professors of Pharmacology as Amici Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 111, at 17-20.
285. See id. at 20.
286. This is a dangerous decision concerning the use of science by legal institutions, and
one which is used to deny a true reflection of the epistemology of pharmacological science.
Deborah M. Hussey Freeland states:
A judge’s decision in litigation has the greatest chance of legitimacy and justice
if it is based on our best knowledge, our most honest and accurate accounts of
real-world events—if it is based on legally found facts of the highest
epistemological quality. If a judge were to base his opinion on lies or
misleading facts, our confidence in his ability to produce a fair decision would
be lessened.
Hussey Freeland, supra note 8, at 310.
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experts who pointed to the unreliable scientific position within Oklahoma’s
execution protocol, which was subsequently corroborated by the amicus
curiae brief of the sixteen professors of pharmacology. 287
Anne Richardson Oakes and Haydn Davies affirm the importance of
trust and confidence in the adjudicative process as the “acceptance of
institutional legitimacy depends in large measure on the extent to which the
procedures of the institution or decision-making body are perceived to be
procedurally fair.” 288 There is significant evidence to demonstrate that the
litigation over Oklahoma’s protocol has been decided unfairly; at each stage
of the appellate process the courts have failed to perform their procedural
functions under the FRE and Daubert. Even worse, these legal results
occurred despite the blatant evidence of the excruciating pain suffered by
Wood, Lockett, and Warner. What Justice Alito’s judgment demonstrates is
that if science is not yet able to give the capital judicial system the answer it
wants, then even with the examples of inmates suffering excruciating pain
and trauma, retentionist mechanisms can be implemented by the highest
level of the judiciary to mold the science to protect the death penalty.
A significant procedural technique for achieving this unsatisfactory
result is placing the burden of proving that the pharmacology is inadequate
onto the petitioner, and not the State. Justice Alito claimed:
When a method of execution is authorized under state law, a
party contending that this method violates the Eighth
Amendment bears the burden of showing that the method creates
an unacceptable risk of pain. Here, petitioners’ own experts
effectively conceded that they lacked evidence to prove their
case beyond dispute.289
Dr. Sasich stated that in comparison to the practice of reliable scientific
methodology, the burden of proof in the capital judicial process “has really
turned the whole situation backwards in terms of trying to assess the safety
and effectiveness of these drugs.” 290 What remains is not a “pure science,”

287. See Brief of Sixteen Professors of Pharmacology as Amici Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 111, at 18-20.
288. Anne Richardson Oakes & Haydn Davies, Process, Outcomes and the Invention of
Tradition: The Growing Importance of the Appearance of Judicial Neutrality, 51 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 573, 573 (2011).
289. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2741.
290. See Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing on Dec. 17, 18, and 19 at 357,
Warner v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).
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but a manifestation of what Sanne H. Knudsen describes as “policy-relevant
science,” which is “shaped by institutional and political interests.”291
The Glossip majority decision is reflective of Masur and Larrimore
Ouellette’s observations on judicial deference mistakes, which have
contributed to a “doctrinal creep by limiting the . . . substantive rights” of
the petitioners.292 What occurred within the district court was that the
“information-forcing function” 293 of the evidentiary hearing had not
achieved the desired result for the capital judicial system through revealing
a clear picture of the pharmacology to put inmates to death. Rather than
providing the truth of scientific uncertainty in a commendable service to the
court, the petitioners’ experts merely became problematic for retentionist
interests and their evidence needed to be distilled and rendered
inapplicable. Knudsen notes that “[t]here are asymmetrical standards of
transparency that apply to government science and private science,”294 and
it is clear that the “private science” of midazolam for use in medical
procedures requires FDA approval and appropriate testing, but the
“government science” of midazolam for use in an execution is a much
lower methodological and scrutiny threshold. From the perspective of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and in the presence of supporting amici,
this makes the Supreme Court’s decision more damning than those of the
district court and the Tenth Circuit. The highest court had the significant
benefit of the scientific insights from the amicus curiae brief of the sixteen
litigant-neutral pharmacologists, and thus had a clearer scientific position
placed before it. For this stage in the appeal there was a total of eighteen
pharmacologists with the opinion that midazolam is not an effective
anesthetic for executions and only one pharmacologist who disagreed.
However, the Supreme Court still applied the standards of confined
government science promoted by the lone pharmacologist over the
alternative corroborated opinions of the eighteen pharmacologists, and to
demonstrate impartiality, sixteen were neutral to the proceedings of the
case.
The impetus for this abhorrent legal mechanism is therefore investigated.
We need to discover the driving force molding the Supreme Court’s
291. Knudsen, supra note 10, at 1516.
292. See Masur & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 233, at 674. The authors also state that
when numerous courts make deference mistakes in habeas corpus petitions “the cumulative
effect of such mistakes would be a systematic shrinking of federal rights.” Id. at 673.
293. Knudsen, supra note 10, at 1512-13 (highlighting the use of litigation as a way to
engender scientific evidence).
294. Id. at 1533.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

604

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:545

affirmation of such unsound pharmacological science. It appears that the
determinative tool was the doctrine of finality, and we are now able to
understand how the shadow of finality has been cast over the process from
the beginning. It is a resolute presence throughout the genealogy of the
judicial assessment of Oklahoma’s execution pharmacology.
3. The Privileging of the Doctrine of Finality
In affirming the district court’s reasoning, Justice Alito cited Baze v.
Rees,295 which stated that allowing legal challenges solely as an avenue to
show failsafe measures for adequate execution methods would “frustrate
the State’s legitimate interest in carrying out a sentence of death in a timely
manner.” 296 This is an adjudicative concession to the jurisprudential corpus
arising from the Herrera v. Collins binding of the doctrine of finality to
capital cases, 297 including the State’s “significant interest” standard in
Nelson, 298 and the “moral dimension” of finality, in that “[o]nly with an
assurance of real finality can the State execute its moral judgment in a
case.” 299 Justice Alito asserted that “challenges to lethal injection protocols
test the boundaries of the authority and competency of federal courts.
Although we must invalidate a lethal injection protocol if it violates the
Eighth Amendment, federal courts should not ‘embroil [themselves] in
ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise.’” 300 What is
damaging to the process is that the pharmacology of midazolam has
stretched the boundary of the federal judiciary’s competency, but instead of
admitting a hitherto institutional incompetence and thus the need for further
testing on the drug, the doctrine of finality has been adopted at all levels of
the judiciary to manufacture a scientific position that packages the
uncertainties of the pharmacological questions into a compartmentalized
adjudicative result. 301 The Glossip majority did nothing to dispel the fact
295. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015) (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 61
(2008)).
296. Baze, 553 U.S. at 35, 61 (emphasis added).
297. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
298. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644.
299. Calderon, 523 U.S. at 556.
300. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2740 (alteration in original) (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 51).
301. This is consistent with observations that institutions can hide behind the simulation
of a pure scientific result, which is in reality a “science-laden policy decision[].” Holly
Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1601,
1639-41, 1646 (2008). Sheila S. Jasanoff has argued that the processes for determining
testing, methodology, and data in science during the regulatory process puts “unusual strains
on science.” Jasanoff, supra note 12, at 195.
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that “[a]dversarial science conjures images of bias[ed], agenda-driven
outcomes.” 302 It is evident that the doctrine of finality is a dominant
component in the “machinery of death.”303
Consequently, in the evolution of humane Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Glossip minority opinion, written by Justice Sotomayor,
provides the guiding moral and scientific light on this issue and renders
transparent the failings of the majority opinion.
C. Justice Sotomayor in Dissent
1. Seeking Transparency of the Pharmacology of Midazolam
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, which was joined by Justices Ginsberg,
Breyer, and Kagan, sets out a holistic approach to the district court’s
consideration of the expert evidence.304 It is clear to Justice Sotomayor that
although there may have been a prima facie symmetrical weighing of each
expert testimony throughout the appellate review, the final outcome is an
unjustifiable dissymmetrical interpretive focus to illegitimately affirm the
State’s position. 305 The majority opinion “sweeps aside substantial
evidence” of the petitioner’s experts, which showed that “while midazolam
may be able to induce unconsciousness, it cannot be utilized to maintain
unconsciousness in the face of agonizing stimuli.” 306 Justice Sotomayor
maintained that the majority followed the unsatisfactory district court
opinion in affirming the “wholly unsupported claims that 500 milligrams of
midazolam will ‘paralyz[e] the brain,’” and consequently the majority
“disregards an objectively intolerable risk of severe pain.”307 The majority
achieved this result “by deferring to the District Court’s decision to credit
the scientifically unsupported and implausible testimony of a single expert
witness,” 308 because “Dr. Evans’ conclusions were entirely unsupported by
any study or third-party source, contradicted by the extrinsic evidence
proffered by petitioners, inconsistent with the scientific understanding of

302. Knudsen, supra note 10, at 1556.
303. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also
Michael Hintze, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: Capital Punishment’s Toll on the
American Judiciary, 89 JUDICATURE 254, 256-57 (2006).
304. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2780-81 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
305. See id. at 2781, 2797.
306. Id. at 2785.
307. Id. at 2785-86 (alterations in original).
308. Id. at 2781.
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midazolam’s properties, and apparently premised on basic logical
errors.” 309
Justice Sotomayor stated that “[g]iven these glaring flaws,” the district
court judgment incorrectly elevated, and privileged, Dr. Evans’s evidence
and, in effect, created the legal picture that the Court was presented with
two equally plausible scientific perspectives on the pharmacology of
midazolam. 310 In Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, the Supreme Court
stated, “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence” that have
been presented to reasonably demonstrate “equal scientific weight,” then
the court has a legitimate function in selecting one scientific body of
opinion over the other.311 However, Justice Sotomayor was of the opinion
that the district court had not been presented with two permissible views of
equal scientific weight, because the State’s expert had “failed to tell ‘a
coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic
evidence.’” 312 At best, what had occurred was that a hypothesis was
proposed by Oklahoma through its execution protocol and was supported
by Dr. Evans through scantly corroborated opinions. The district court
accepted an insufficiently supported proposition, so the Supreme Court
should not abdicate its “duty to examine critically the factual predicates.”313
In placing the evidence within a holistic evaluation, it is clear that Justice
Sotomayor engaged the evidentiary guidance of the FRE Rule 702, in that
the State’s case had not presented sufficient scientific data, it was not a
product of reliable principles and methods, and the science was not reliably
applied to the case. In support of her nuanced understanding of the law and
science, Justice Sotomayor demonstrated an acute appreciation of the issue
of GABA receptors and the insufficient inhibiting function of midazolam,
which is supported by the amicus brief of the sixteen professors of
pharmacology:
These inconsistencies and inaccuracies go to the very heart of
Dr. Evans’ expert opinion, as they were the key components of
his professed belief that one can extrapolate from what is known

309. Id. at 2788.
310. See id.
311. 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985) (noting that two facially plausible stories “can virtually
never be clear error”).
312. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S.
at 574-75).
313. Id. at 2786.
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about midazolam’s effect at low doses to conclude that the drug
would “paralyz[e] the brain” at Oklahoma’s planned dose.314
To disprove this assertion, Justice Sotomayor cited the botched executions
of Lockett and Wood.315 She stated that Lockett’s autopsy report
determined “that the concentration of midazolam in Lockett’s blood was
more than sufficient to render an average person unconscious.”316
Concerning the execution of Wood, Justice Sotomayor argued that
“[d]espite being given over 750 milligrams of midazolam, Wood gasped
and snorted for nearly two hours. These reactions were, according to Dr.
Lubarsky, inconsistent with Wood being fully anesthetized, and belie the
claim that a lesser dose of 500 milligrams would somehow suffice.” 317
Furthermore, the improvements in the execution technologies would not
rectify the inherent problems with the pharmacology, as she argued that
none of the State’s “safeguards” for administering these drugs
would seem to mitigate the substantial risk that midazolam will
not work, as the Court contends. Protections ensuring that
officials have properly secured a viable IV site will not enable
midazolam to have an effect that it is chemically incapable of
having. 318
Justice Sotomayor opined that an adjudicative error was made. In United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., the Supreme Court held that clear error
exists “when although there is evidence to support” a finding, “the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”319 A holistic review of the
evidence was provided to argue that the district court clearly erred in
relying on the State’s singular scientific evidence. The majority opinion
cited the three experts, but they did not provide an “entire review” that was
necessary under Gypsum and the standards of review as guided by the FRE
and Daubert. David Bernstein has argued that the Supreme Court should
“step in at any time to reign in wayward circuits” 320 in their misapplication
of Rule 702, and this is what Justice Sotomayor and the minority tried to
do. However, the majority opinion “has allowed lower court judges
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Id. at 2787 (alteration in original).
Id. at 2790-91.
Id. at 2782.
Id. at 2791 (internal citation omitted).
Id. (internal citation omitted).
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
Bernstein, supra note 132, at 69.
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significant latitude to ignore Rule 702,”321 or at least only pay lip service to
the FRE while refusing to apply the codified evidentiary standards.
2. The Alternative Execution Method Requirement
Justice Sotomayor criticized the Glossip majority opinion for imputing
the petitioner with a supposed Baze requirement of the need to identify an
alternative execution method. 322 She argued that the majority converted
“this categorical prohibition into a conditional one. A method of execution
that is intolerably painful—even to the point of being the chemical
equivalent of burning alive—will, the Court holds, be unconstitutional if,
and only if, there is a ‘known and available alternative’ method of
execution.” 323 The Baze holding on the “known-and-available-alternative
requirement” was based on a weak constitutional foundation of a plurality
opinion, 324 which did not create a solid precedent value.325 There is a prior
example of this rule in death penalty jurisprudence. In 1972, the case of
Furman v. Georgia provided a plurality opinion that the state capital
statutes allowed too much discretion to the legal fact finder and were thus
unconstitutional, but the plurality holding did not agree on the boundaries
and applicability of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments or the scope of equal protection under law within the
Fourteenth Amendment. 326 Julian Killingley described the Furman
judgment as an “anodyne per curiam opinion,” 327 which consequently only
suspended the death penalty in the United States, before the state capital
statute’s deficiencies were perceived to be rectified by 1976 in Gregg v.
Georgia. 328 Therefore, the ratio of a judgment needs to be identified when
plurality opinions are offered as precedent, and for guidance the Supreme
Court stated in Marks v. United States that “the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.” 329

321. Id.
322. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2793-94 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 2793.
324. The plurality opinion judges were: Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Stevens,
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
325. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2793-94 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
326. See generally 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
327. Julian Killingley, Constraining America’s Death Penalty: The Eighth Amendment
and Excessive Punishment, in AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 106, at 127, 139.
328. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
329. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citation omitted).
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Justice Sotomayor stated that the Glossip majority unjustifiably deviated
from the “narrowest grounds” principle, and thus “divines from Baze” that
the petitioner must “prove the availability of an alternative means of
execution,” and as such, it did not “represent the views of a majority of the
Court” 330 as is also required by CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America. 331 The plurality opinion in Baze only speaks to the per se
constitutionality of the death penalty by lethal injection, 332 and the
alternative method is confined to the plurality holding and does not have the
constitutional authority that the Glossip majority now seeks to impose upon
the petitioners. It was thus wrongly decided and the district court made a
deference mistake, which the majority now compounds. 333 This is because
the alternative method criteria is contingent upon the Supreme Court
overruling Hill v. McDonough, 334 which it did not do in Baze. In Hill, the
Supreme Court held that in the plaintiff’s challenge to his execution under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil action for deprivation of rights
including issues of prison confinement, he need not “identif[y] an
alternative, authorized method of execution.” 335 The Court affirmed that
there was no constitutional basis for creating an “[i]mposition of heightened
pleading requirements” 336 upon the plaintiffs. Consequently, Justice
Sotomayor reasoned that “[t]he Baze plurality opinion should not be
understood to have so carelessly tossed aside Hill’s underlying premise.” 337
This reasoning finds support in the amicus curiae brief of the Louis Stein
Center for Law and Ethics at Fordham University School of Law, which
argued that in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation the “challenges to lethal injection

330. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2793 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
331. 481 U.S. 69, 81 (1987).
332. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2794 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
333. See Masur & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 233, at 669-70. (The article engages
with Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 2000), in which it was argued that both the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court of Ohio had made a deference
mistake and wrongly applied the Supreme Court’s ruling in Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S.
226 (1971)). Id. Britt established that “the State must . . . provide indigent prisoners with the
basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to
other prisoners.” Britt, 404 U.S. at 227.
334. 547 U.S. 573 (2006).
335. Id. at 582.
336. Id.
337. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2795 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

610

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:545

protocols should not be restricted to instances in which an inmate can
identify a specific available alternative.” 338
To complete the deconstruction of the majority’s unsatisfactory
reasoning on this issue, Justice Sotomayor stated that “[i]n reengineering
Baze to support its newfound rule, the Court appears to rely on a flawed
syllogism. If the death penalty is constitutional . . . then there must be a
means of accomplishing it.” 339 She continued to explain it is flawed because
[i]f all available means of conducting an execution constitute
cruel and unusual punishment, then conducting the execution
will constitute cruel and usual punishment. Nothing compels a
State to perform an execution. It does not get a constitutional
free pass simply because it desires to deliver the ultimate
penalty; its ends do not justify any and all means. If a State
wishes to carry out an execution, it must do so subject to the
constraints that our Constitution imposes on it, including the
obligation to ensure that its chosen method is not cruel and
unusual. Certainly the condemned has no duty to devise or pick a
constitutional instrument of his or her own death. 340
Consequently, torturous levels are maintained within the capital judicial
system, as Justice Sotomayor reasoned that “Oklahoma’s current protocol is
a barbarous method of punishment—the chemical equivalent of being
burned alive.” 341 Significantly, for the constitutional arguments that analyze
cruel and unusual punishments,
it would not matter whether the State intended to use midazolam,
or instead to have petitioners drawn and quartered, slowly
tortured to death, or actually burned at the stake: because
petitioners failed to prove the availability of sodium thiopental or
pentobarbital, the State could execute them using whatever
means it designated.342
This is a damning indictment of the majority opinion.
338. Brief for The Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics at Fordham University School
of Law, supra note 109, at 31-32 (citing Hill, 547 U.S. at 580-81; and Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 213 (2007)). Jones stated that Hill “unanimously rejected a proposal that § 1983
suits challenging a method of execution must identify an acceptable alternative.” Jones, 549
U.S. at 213.
339. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2795 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
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The Glossip majority’s confidence in the State was subsequently tested
in the planning and logistics of the next execution. It will be determined
whether the improvements to Oklahoma’s execution protocol would render
a constitutional punishment. Justice Sotomayor, along with Justices
Ginsberg, Breyer, and Kagan, were unconfident about this possibility.
Evaluating subsequent events in Oklahoma the minority sentiment was
clearly justified.
VII. Almost a Postscript: Human Error and
the Unfinal Decision Post-Glossip
A. The Stay of Richard Glossip’s Execution: Negligence, But Not as Was
Envisaged
After the Supreme Court denied Glossip relief, Oklahoma initiated
proceedings to judicially put him to death. From the State’s position the
comity interests had been adequately fulfilled and legitimate finality could
now be initiated in the execution. A manifestation of human error occurred,
however, that was not envisaged previously in the Warner-Glossip
litigation. It was not the possibility of negligence regarding the use and
biological effect of midazolam—it was an act of negligence in the
pharmacist proscribing “potassium acetate” instead of “potassium
chloride,” and the Department’s chain of possession criteria failing to
identify the error until the moment of the preparations for the execution. 343
Thus, Governor Mary Fallin issued an Executive Order halting the
execution, 344 and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals then granted a
stay on October 2, 2015. 345 On October 16, 2015, the district court declared
Richard Glossip’s case to be “administratively closed” 346 and held that it
343. See Okla. Exec. Dep’t, Okla. Exec. Order No. 2015-42 (Sept. 30, 2015) (“This stay
is ordered due to the Department of Corrections having received potassium acetate as drug
number three for the three-drug protocol.”). Scott Pruitt, the Attorney General of Oklahoma,
argued that “the Office of the Attorney General needs time to evaluate the events that
transpired on September 30, 2015, ODOC’s acquisition of a drug contrary to protocol, and
ODOC’s internal procedures relative to the protocol. The State has a strong interest in
ensuring that the execution protocol is strictly followed.” State’s Notice and Request for
Stay of Execution Dates at 2, Glossip v. Oklahoma, Nos. D-2005-310 (Glossip), D-2000-653
(Grant), D-2004-1260 (Cole) (Okla. Crim. App. Oct. 1, 2015).
344. Okla. Exec. Dep’t, Okla. Exec. Order No. 2015-42 (Sept. 30, 2015).
345. Order Issuing Stay at 2, Glossip v. Oklahoma, Nos. D-2005-310, D-2000-653, D2004-1260 (Okla. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2015).
346. Order Granting Joint Stipulation at 2, Glossip v. Gross, No. CIV-14-665-F (W.D.
Okla. Oct. 16, 2015).
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would not be in the “interests of judicial economy and comity” for
Oklahoma to seek an execution at this time. 347
Here, we see a transparent review of the logistics of Oklahoma’s
execution protocol, and the initiation of comity interests to suspend the
finality of an execution. To fulfill the “interests of judicial economy and
comity,” a grand jury review commenced from October 2015348 through
May 2016. 349 Then on May 31, 2016, the Status Report noted that the
Fifteenth Multicounty Grand Jury issued its findings 350 and concluded that
the “Department of Corrections staff, and others participating in the
execution process, failed to perform their duties with the precision and
attention to detail the exercise of state authority in such cases demands,” 351
and “[t]his investigation has revealed that most Department employees
profoundly misunderstood the Protocol.” 352 Hence, there was a systematic
failure to ensure the constitutionality of Oklahoma’s execution process, and
based on these adverse incidents, and in an expression of finality interests,
the Multicounty Grand Jury concluded that “justice has been delayed for
the victims’ families and the citizens of Oklahoma, and confidence further
shaken in the ability of this State to carry out the death penalty.” 353
New issues of comity and finality have surfaced following the Supreme
Court’s Glossip ruling, demonstrating that the overall confidence in the

347. Id. (stating that “[i]t would be in the interests of judicial economy and comity for the
Oklahoma Attorney General not to seek an execution date” until the investigations into the
protocol had concluded and the results reviewed, and any amendments to the protocol
provided (emphasis added)).
348. Status Report at 2-3, Glossip v. Oklahoma, Nos. D-2005-310 (Glossip), D-2000-653
(Grant), D-2004-1260 (Cole) (Okla. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2015).
349. Status Report at 1, Glossip v. Oklahoma, Nos. D-2005-310 (Glossip), D-2000-653
(Grant), D-2004-1260 (Cole), D-1996-121 (Fairchild), D-2006-38 (Williams) (Okla. Crim.
App. May 17, 2016).
350. Status Report at 1, Glossip v. Oklahoma, Nos. D-2005-310 (Glossip), D-2000-653
(Grant), D-2004-1260 (Cole), D-1996-121 (Fairchild), D-2006-338 (Williams) (Okla. Crim.
App. May. 31, 2016). After the Fifteenth Multicounty Grand Jury issued its report setting out
its findings, another updated Status Report referenced the jury report and noted: “The report
made recommendations which must be reviewed, considered and, if deemed necessary,
implemented by the Department of Corrections. Thus, although the investigation is
complete, it is still not the appropriate time to set an execution date.” Status Report at 2,
Glossip v. Oklahoma, Nos. D-2005-310 (Glossip), D-2000-653 (Grant), D-2004-1260
(Cole), D-1996-121 (Fairchild), D-2006-338 (Williams), D-2006-126 (Hanson) (Okla. Crim.
App. June 30, 2016).
351. Interim Report Number 14, supra note 5, at 1.
352. Id. at 105.
353. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
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state’s execution protocol was in many ways based upon illusory
determinations. Due to the Multicounty Grand Jury investigations, it is no
longer a foregone conclusion that Oklahoma can initiate effective comity
review to create a constitutional execution. Furthermore, the investigations
have brought to light that even in the previous execution of Charles Warner,
there are now significant factors questioning the constitutionality of his
execution as instead of potassium chloride, potassium acetate, a drug not
included in the execution protocol, was wrongly provided and wrongly
used. Warner’s execution may now be regarded as an illegitimate
application of finality in the death penalty.
B. The False Comity and Illegitimate Finality in Charles Warner’s
Execution
The investigations into the failings of the logistical preparations for
Richard Glossip’s execution uncovered that there was also hitherto
unknown negligence in the preceding execution of Charles Warner. Before
the execution of Warner, his attorneys were supplied with a notice from the
Department that the three-drug protocol of Chart D (midazolam,
vecuronium bromide, and potassium chloride) would be used in his
execution on January 15, 2015. 354 On the day of Warner’s execution, an
anonymized “Warden A” opened the box but did not realize that the wrong
potassium had been ordered and sent by the pharmacist.355 Although the
vials had “potassium acetate” written on them, the various members of the
Department’s execution teams did not notice that this drug was not
mandated within the execution protocol.356 Warner’s execution began at
7:10 p.m., and he was pronounced dead at 7:28 p.m. 357

354. Id. at 30. “[T]he chain of custody form contains the Pharmacist’s name, the
receiving party’s name, the date and time the drugs were received, and the drug’s storage
location upon receipt,” but the form did not contain any information on the contents of the
drugs. Id. at 31-32.
355. See id. at 33. The pharmacist explained to the Grand Jury:
When I looked through the ordering system, I looked at potassium. . . .I did not
look at the salt form like I should have. In my pharmacy, my – in my brain, the
potassiums are interchangeable. They’re not generic. . . . but in a setting that
they’re used in, potassium is the drug that we’re looking for. I did not look
close enough and look at the acetate or chloride. I was looking at potassium.
Id. at 27-28.
356. Id. at 33-36. In responding to questions before the Grand Jury, the IV Team Leader
stated:
All I can conjecture is that this was my first foray into this very unusual world
of executions, lethal injections. And as you can imagine, my anxiety level was
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Following the execution, a full inventory was taken of the drugs, the
empty vials were stored, and an “After-Action Review” was held with the
Director, the IV Team, the Restraint Team, and the Special Operations
Team. 358 At the briefing “no concerns were expressed regarding the
execution drugs utilized.” 359 Members of Oklahoma’s Chief Medical
Examiner’s Office (“OCME”), then provided Charles Warner’s body and
the drugs used for the autopsy report, which included photographs of the
empty vials and syringes. 360 In the autopsy report, the OCME noted that
what was submitted with Warner’s body included a “[w]hite box containing
12 empty vials labelled ’20 mL single dose Potassium Acetate
Injection.’” 361 The OCME employees stated that they were not familiar
with the specifics of Chart D drugs and had no reason to know the legal
procedures in this specific execution.362
Upon completion of an execution, the Department’s Division Manager
for Field Support is tasked with conducting a Quality Assurance Review to
evaluate the performance of the execution process, and to report his
findings to the Director. 363 The report did not pick up on the use of
“potassium acetate,” as opposed to “potassium chloride,” so the Division
Manager did not record any of the failings in the chain of custody of the
execution drugs. 364 The Warner Autopsy Report was then circulated to
various employees of the Department of Corrections, who along with the
Office of the Governor, did not observe the reference in the report of the
use of the “Potassium Acetate Injection.’” 365 In March and April 2015, as
part of the investigations and litigation into Glossip’s case, the Attorney
General’s Solicitor General’s Unit, the Litigation Unit, and the Federal
Public Defender’s Office received a copy of the autopsy report, but the use

significant . . . . the high stress environment is not new to me, but this was very
unique and very unusual. Id. at 36.
357. Id. at 38-40.
358. See id. at 42-44.
359. Id. at 44.
360. See id. at 42-43.
361. Id. at 46-47 (emphasis added).
362. Id. at 47.
363. Id. at 49.
364. See id. at 49-51 (noting that “[a]lthough the Division Manager for Field Support had
a PhD in clinical psychology, he had no specialized training in conducting quality assurance
reviews of executions”).
365. Id. at 53.
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of potassium acetate was not discovered at this point.366 A contributory
factor was that the litigation at this time was intensely focused on the
constitutionality of midazolam and its appropriateness for use as an
anesthetic in the execution, rather than on the fact that potassium chloride
and not potassium acetate was designated as the third drug within Chart
D. 367
C. The New Negligence in the Execution Procedure for Richard Glossip
In preparation for Richard Glossip’s execution, the Office of the
Attorney General’s Litigation Unit notified Glossip’s lawyers that the
Department would use the drugs in Chart D. 368 Following the same chain of
custody that was used in the Warner execution, the anonymized “Warden
A” unpacked the drugs and photographed them. 369 This time he noticed the
vials stated “potassium acetate,” but he did not notify any of the execution
teams that the drug was not the one classified in Chart D. 370 Warden A
assumed that the drugs had previously been checked and therefore
proceeded with the execution. 371 When the IV Team Leader was drawing
up the syringes he likewise noticed that some of the vials were labelled
potassium acetate, but in deviating from the practice of Warden A, the
Leader made the decision to notify the Department of Correction’s General
Counsel. 372
The Attorney General’s Office advised that the execution should not
proceed if potassium chloride, the drug explicitly referred to in Chart D,
366. Id. at 54-55. It was decided that the Director of the DoC had orally modified the
execution protocol with authority. See id. at 82-83. An agent with the Department’s Office
of Inspector General (“OIG Agent 1”) failed to inspect the execution drugs while
transporting them to the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, and Warden A failed to notify anyone
in the Department that potassium acetate had been received. Id. at 57-58. The IV Team
failed to observe the Department had received the wrong execution drugs. The Department’s
Execution Protocol failed to define important terms, and lacked controls to ensure the proper
execution drugs were obtained and administered. See id. at 84-85.
367. Id. at 56-57.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 58.
370. Id. at 58-59. Before the Grand Jury, “Warden A,” stated:
I didn’t know who ordered the drugs. That’s not part of my job duty. I didn’t
know it hadn’t been looked at, I assumed it had been. I assumed that what the
pharmacist provided was what [sic] we needed. So in my mind, that potassium
acetate must have been the same thing as potassium chloride.
Id. at 59.
371. Id. at 59.
372. Id. at 63-64.
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was not available. 373 Governor Fallin was informed of the current legal
position, and issued “Executive Order 2015-42, granting Glossip a thirtyseven day stay of execution.” 374 The Office of the Governor put out a press
release entitled, “Questions and Answers regarding Richard Glossip’s stay
of execution,” which stated:
The decision to delay the execution was made because of the
legal ambiguity surrounding the use of potassium acetate. Out of
an abundance of caution and acting on the advice of the attorney
general and her legal staff, Gov. Fallin delayed Glossip’s
execution so any legal ambiguities could be addressed. 375
The Office of the Attorney General then filed a Notice and Request for
Stay of Execution on October 1, arguing that it needed “‘time to evaluate
the events that transpired on September 30, 2015, the Department’s
acquisition of a drug contrary to protocol, and the Department’s internal
procedures relative to the protocol’ due to the State’s ‘strong interest in
ensuring that the Execution Protocol is strictly followed.’” 376 In this
suspension of the finality of the execution, the State of Oklahoma initiated
further review.
Following the submission of the Multicounty Grand Jury’s Interim
Report, three key issues have emerged: (a) there was an unjustifiable oral
change of the protocol to attempt to complete the execution;377 (b) there
was a systematic failure of the staff of the Department of Corrections; 378
and (c) in the attempt to prevent future problems and facilitate the
Department staff’s adherence of the protocol, 379 the Governor introduced
initiatives for the Oklahoma State Penitentiary to obtained a license to store
the drugs used in the execution protocol. 380 This license is an attempt to
rectify the issues preventing the obtaining of correct drugs.
373. Id. at 66.
374. Id. at 69.
375. Id. at 72-73 (emphasis added).
376. Id. at 73.
377. Id. at 82-83.
378. Id. at 74-75.
379. Id. at 100-06.
380. Whilst the Grand Jury was conducting its investigations, to help promote comity and
finality, the governor identified a key problem to be rectified. Of issue was that controlled
dangerous substances (“CDS”) are regulated in the State of Oklahoma within a dualregistration process by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) and the Oklahoma
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (“OBNDD”). Id. at 18. Up until the date of the
proposed Glossip execution, the Oklahoma Department of Corrections did not have a

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss4/1

2017]

OKLAHOMA’S LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOL

617

The grand jury found that the execution protocol had been illegitimately
changed by the Director and the Governor’s General Counsel. 381 The
Governor’s General Counsel testified to the grand jury that even though he
had learned that the pharmacist supplied the wrong potassium, his
recommendation was to “proceed with Glossip’s execution, and then seek
‘clarification on the protocol’ prior to the next execution.” 382 This action is
indicative of the promotion of the State’s finality interest in rendering an
execution, but in this instance, it was illegitimately applied and extralegally pursued. The actions of the Governor’s General Counsel clashed
with Glossip’s finality interest in protecting his rights to only have imposed
upon him constitutional punishment, resulting in a suspension of the
execution in a recognition of the need for further comity review. It is clear
that the pressure on the system can cause decisions to be made that are not
sanctioned by the execution protocol.
This pressure, which contributes to unjustifiable decisions, was
compounded by the recent history of the increased difficulties in obtaining
appropriate execution drugs. 383 The Department’s General Counsel noted
that the pharmacy which supplied the drugs for the Lockett execution
“refused to continue to participate in future executions.”384 The Office of
registered license with the OBNDD to store CDS’s at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, and
so CDS had to be transferred to the Penitentiary on the day of an execution. See id. at 18-21.
This caused comity and finality problems, which are engaged with above, but on April 19,
2016, Governor Fallin signed Senate Bill 884 which came into effect on November 1, 2016,
allowing the Department to register with OBNDD. It enables the Department to allow OSP
to store CDS’s to be used in executions. Id. at 21.
381. Id. at 67, 82-83.
382. Id. at 67. The Interim Report noted that on “the interchangeability of potassium
chloride and potassium acetate, the Pharmacist explained to the Grand Jury that the active
ingredient” was potassium ion and that the difference is that “[c]hloride and acetate are two
types of salts to which the potassium ion attaches.” Id. at 27. Thus, the active ingredient is
the same (potassium) and it is still evident, following the Warner execution, that death
occurs. See id. The question then comes whether the Execution Protocol allows “potassium
acetate” to be used instead of the designated “potassium chloride” in Chart D.
383. Id. at 76 (“The Department’s General Counsel explained that qualified doctors are
often unwilling to assist or are prohibited from assisting in executions due to their medical
ethics and professional societies’ rules, even banning certain types of doctors from even
being present at executions. Further, obtaining proper drugs from pharmacies has become
increasingly difficult since pharmaceutical companies are limiting their supplies of lethal
injection drugs, and pharmacies themselves are often unwilling to supply drugs to the
Department due to privacy and safety concerns.” (footnote omitted)).
384. Id. at 22 n.115. There is a growing moral and professional bulwark against
healthcare professionals participating in executions. See generally Litton, supra note 107
(discussing the ethical assessments with physicians and executions).
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the Attorney General revealed that it could not obtain pentobarbital and this
was the reason for clarifying the use of the drugs in Chart D (which
included midazolam). 385 However, these reasons do not mitigate or render
justifiable the actions of the Governor’s General Counsel, as the
Multicounty Grand Jury’s Interim Report concluded:
It is unacceptable for the Governor’s General Counsel to so
flippantly and recklessly disregard the written Protocol and the
rights of Richard Glossip. Given the gravity of the death penalty,
as well as the national scrutiny following the Lockett execution,
the Governor’s Counsel should have been unwilling to take such
chances. Regardless of the fact the wrong drug was used to
execute Warner, the Governor’s Counsel should have
resoundingly recommended an immediate stay of execution to
allow time to locate potassium chloride. 386
This attempt to orally change the execution protocol unintentionally
wove together the assessment of the unknown biological effects of an
injection of potassium acetate with the assessment of the unknown effects
of the injection of 500mg of midazolam. What is currently maintained is the
possibility of creating the inmate in the guise of a death row version of
“Schrödinger’s Cat.” 387 The district court’s evidentiary hearing and the
Multicounty Grand Jury’s deliberations on the human error in using
potassium acetate demonstrate the danger that the physiology of death by
execution can ultimately produce an opaque phenomenon in which there
will be a superposition of coexisting possibilities—that the inmate strapped
to the gurney will have his Eighth Amendment rights both protected and
violated. Just as we do not know if Erwin Schrödinger’s cat is dead or alive
385. Interim Report Number 14, supra note 5, at 22 (“The first pharmacist contacted
refused, the second agreed to provide execution drugs but could not get pentobarbital, and
the others also could not obtain pentobarbital. As a result, the Department decided to utilize
Chart D of the Execution Protocol instead.” (footnote omitted)).
386. Id. at 100.
387. Erwin Schrödinger created a thought experiment to solve the problem of the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, and identified the paradox of a physical
state of simultaneous existence. Joseph Blocher, Schrödinger’s Cross: The Quantum
Mechanics of the Establishment Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 51, 51-53 (2010). This
theory has been applied to legal norms. See Barbara Yngvesson & Susan Coutin,
Schrödinger’s Cat and the Ethnography of Law, 31 POLAR: POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY
REV. 61 (2008); John D. Briggs, Schrödinger’s Cat and Extraterritoriality, 29 ANTITRUST 79
(2014); Derek E. Bambauer, Schrödinger’s Cybersecurity, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791
(2015).
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unless we lift the lid and take a look inside the box, we do not know to a
reasonable level of scientific certainty whether the administration of
midazolam and (if the Director and the Governor’s General Counsel had
gotten their way) potassium acetate, works in the way mandated by
constitutional punishment until an autopsy report of the dead inmate can
reveal what happened in his blood stream and internal organs.
If an execution is proven ex post facto to be torturous (as needless
suffering was imposed) it is unconstitutional, and thus an illegitimate
manifestation of finality has occurred (as in Warner’s execution). This postpunishment revelation, however, does not help the inmate as he or she will
already be dead. Indeed, the former Supreme Court Justice John Paul
Stevens argued that “the finality of state action terminating the life of one
of its citizens precludes any possible redress if a mistake does occur.” 388
Such presence of uncertainty, and thus the need for an ex post facto
investigation, is unacceptable as a principle of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence and human dignity in punishment. Although the risk of the
unknown for the existence of the superposition may be a legitimate basis
for a hypothesis in physics for determining quantum theory, that risk in
lethal injection procedure is unacceptable as a principle of humane
punishment. We need to do better than that. And if we cannot, we need to
admit it and discontinue this punishment.
VIII. Conclusion: The Interaction of Comity and Finality to Reveal the
Irredeemable Constitutional Deficiencies of the Death Penalty in Oklahoma
This critique has placed the consideration of Oklahoma’s execution
protocol in the Warner-Glossip litigation within two methods of assessment
to uncover the reasons for the human error and the lack of confidence in the
state being able to maintain a humane lethal injection process. The methods
presented were (a) the procedural review provided within the principles of
comity and finality and (b) the scientific methodologies of atomism and
holism for determining the epistemology of the pharmacology. These
methods were used to provide a critique of the adjudicative assessment by
the district court, the Tenth Circuit, and the Supreme Court so as to uncover
the extent to which accurate data and methodologies were used in
compliance or in violation of the FRE and Daubert standards of review.
Then following further examples of human error in the execution protocol,
the Multicounty Grand Jury’s investigations were analyzed to consider the
388. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW
CONSTITUTION 122 (2014).
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questions concerning the maladministration of various members of the
execution teams. The grand jury also reflected both comity and finality
assessments in not only its procedural review but also in its search for the
epistemology in the pharmacology for executions.
The above analysis has attempted to demonstrate that the State of
Oklahoma, and the federal adjudicative process, has failed in the
consideration of Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol. Sound scientific
methodology and data has not been provided to affirm the claimed
legitimacy of Oklahoma’s use of midazolam in the protocol. It has been
argued that the judicial system—from the district court to the Supreme
Court—misapplied the comity and finality principles and unjustifiably
sidelined sound science in providing a packaged, policy-driven outcome of
the methodology and data. This occurred through a judicial management
that protected the State’s atomistic viewpoints on the science, to the
detriment of sound pharmacology through holistic methodology.
Consequently, torturous executions will be maintained, and the evidence of
Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich, and of the sixteen litigant-neutral
pharmacologists, clearly demonstrate that midazolam will not work in the
way that the State claims. This is because the drug (a) has a ceiling effect,
making it ineffective as an anesthetic in the execution; (b) does not have
sufficient analgesic properties, resulting in the inmate’s experience of an
enhanced pain sensation (needless suffering); and (c) will very likely induce
paradoxical manifestations resulting in the drug not producing its intended
effects. It is most unsatisfactory in the presence of such overwhelming
scientific evidence that the State of Oklahoma was allowed to maintain this
drug within its execution protocol.
The governmental confidence in Oklahoma’s capital judicial system—
following the creation of the new execution facility, the enhanced execution
procedures to eradicate human error, and the array of drug options in Charts
A-D—should now be seen as unfounded. The negligence of the prison
obtaining potassium acetate instead of potassium chloride, the use of this
wrong drug in Charles Warner’s execution, and the attempted use of it in
Richard Glossip’s execution, was the result of an illegitimate oral change in
the execution protocol. Following this unconscionable event, Governor
Fallin made a commendable decision to impose a detailed comity review of
Oklahoma’s execution protocol. The subsequent Multicounty Grand Jury
affirmed the presence of human error and the unsanctioned oral change of
the protocol. A logical conclusion can be drawn from the review, revealing
that in the execution protocol, after forty years of experimentation (since
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the invention of lethal injection in 1977), it is very likely that future human
error will occur and even manifest in hitherto undiscovered ways.
In Baze v. Rees, Justice Stevens stated that the death penalty was a
product of “habit and inattention rather than an acceptable deliberative
process.” 389 It is clear that Oklahoma reflects this damning inattention and
thus maintains an unacceptable mode of punishment. We are at a moment
in the history of the death penalty where we can say that the comity
interests expressed in the capital judicial system will consistently
demonstrate to the state-federal architecture that the death penalty is an
unconstitutional punishment. The transparency offered by a detailed review
will reveal that the death penalty is an illegitimate manifestation of finality,
and thus should be found to be an unconstitutional punishment. We are now
living in a moment in which the death penalty should be considered per se
cruel and unusual punishment. The death penalty is a barbaric vestige of a
bygone era, and it should be castigated to the historical annals of the State
of Oklahoma.

389. 553 U.S. 35, 78 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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